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*

ABSTRACT
Each individual has a background, and that background shapes the individual’s views about life, creating an inevitable form of bias referred to as “experiential bias.” Experiential bias is shaped by many identity traits, including, among
others, race, sex, sexual orientation, religion and even geography. The geographic
identity of state judges and their potential unfair experiential bias is the common
justification for federal court diversity jurisdiction. But experiential bias is inescapable, affecting everyone who's ever had an experience, and is generally not
unfair, as demonstrated by most studies regarding the "fairness" justification for
diversity jurisdiction. More recently, Justice O’Connor connected racial and geographic identity in her Grutter opinion, specifically acknowledging that the experiences associated with race and with growing up in a particular region shape a
person’s views. This article explores how geographic identity and other identity
traits are important to both federalism and equality principles because state identity is at the heart of federalism and individual identity is at the heart of equality.
Both states and individuals, with the associated experiential biases stemming
from geography and other identity traits, have interests in being represented in a
democracy that values federalism and equality.
In recent years, the geographic background of the United States Supreme
Court, for instance, has shifted from one which is representative of the nation, to
one dominated by appellate judges from the northeast. The importance of this
shift cannot be overstated, as studies have shown that judges are as much as twice
as likely to affirm opinions from their geographic “home” courts as those from
any other. Also, as discussed following Justice Sotomayor's "wise Latina woman"
comment, the Court lacks diversity in ways that implicate equality principles as
well. This article concludes that for purposes of federalism, diversity, and equality, the selection pool for Article III judges must be broadened in terms of both
geography and experience.
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Irving Cypen Professor of
Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. My deep appreciation goes to the
Cypen Family and Deans Robert Jerry and Alyson Flournoy for their enduring and
generous support of my research. I also want to thank my faculty for its encouragement in this project. Paul Guglizza, Lyrissa Lidsky, Amy Mashburn, Ken Nunn, Bill
Page, Roger Perlstadt, and Michael Wolf helped talk me through many of these ideas.
Jordan Pratt (J.D. ’12) was the first to help me shape some of these ideas and I am
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“The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”
– Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

I. INTRODUCTION
What does a state’s interest in federalism have in common with an individual’s interest in equality? This Article offers an answer to this question by
exploring the rich and complicated relationship among federalism, diversity,
equality, and the Article III judiciary. This relationship takes center stage in a
number of cases decided by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. For example,
in the 2013 term alone the Court decided cases involving the balance between
federalism and equality in the areas of voting rights,1 gay rights,2 and affirmative action.3 For the past several decades, the Court has been increasingly
interested in deciding cases in which federalism and equality are pitted
against each other. This Article suggests that remarkable similarities exist
between a state’s interest in federalism and an individual’s interest in equality. An exploration of geography, identity, and bias in the context of the Article III judiciary highlights those similarities.
The idea for this exploration springs from the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Grutter v. Bollinger, in which the Court held that a state has a compelling
interest in admitting a diverse class of students to its public universities,
and can therefore use race as a factor in making admissions decisions.4
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor opined: “Just as growing up in
a particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely
to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of

1. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013)
(holding that federal law preempts Arizona’s proof of citizenship requirement for
voting in federal elections); Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631
(2013) (holding section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 unconstitutional because
the formula used for evaluating whether a state needs preclearance is not up-to-date).
2. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that section
2 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as between a man and a
woman, is unconstitutional); Perry v. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013)
(holding that private party plaintiffs lacked standing to defend a state statute by challenging the lower courts’ rulings that California’s ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional). The Windsor decision further acknowledged that states have the authority
to decide whether or not to allow same-sex marriage, but the federal government
cannot deny the equal protection of same sex couples who are validly married by their
state. 133 S. Ct. at 2691.
3. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (stating that “[s]trict
scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions
process uses race in a permissible way without a court giving close analysis to the
evidence of how the process works in practice.”).
4. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
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being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately
still matters.” 5
No one is surprised that racial identity helps shape a person’s views
or that valuing diverse viewpoints supports racial equality.
Justice
O’Connor’s opinion, however, highlights that geographic identity also influences an individual’s views. And, of course, federalism and geography are
inextricably intertwined.
Justice O’Connor’s observation, that both geographic and racial identity
help shape an individual’s views, invites an exploration into the similarities
between the two and how they relate to federalism and equality. Understanding this relationship is critically important, especially given the country’s
history. Significantly, geography and race shaped the states’ earliest identities, particularly in the ways that the country respected a state’s identity and
sovereignty at the expense of slaves and their individual racial identities. 6
The desire of some states to expand slavery into the new Western territories
created a major rift between states that began to identify as either “slave” or
“free” states.7 These differences ultimately caused the Civil War.
The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, but the historical slavery
divide that separated the North from the South had a lasting impact on the
identities of those regions and the states and individuals within those regions.
For example, the issue in the recent Supreme Court case Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder was whether Shelby County, Alabama, and other counties
and states more generally, no longer discriminated on the basis of race in its
voting practices, thus freeing the county from having to seek preclearance
from the federal government before implementing any changes to its voting
laws. 8 Chief Justice Roberts asked during oral arguments if it was the government’s position that “the citizens in the South are more racist than citizens
in the North[.]”9 At a press conference following the hearing, Shelby County
Attorney Frank Ellis said, “We are a different and better nation today so it is
only right that our federal laws should treat each of the 50 states equally.”10

5. Id. at 333.
6. See generally Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. R EV. 401

(2013) (suggesting that constitutional doctrine should consider the way people inside
a geographic space are treated to determine if discrimination exists).
7. Id. at 426.
8. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627-28 (2013).
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-42, Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S.
Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-96.pdf; Adam Liptak, Voting Rights Law
Draws Skepticism from Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/02/28/us/politics/conservative-justices-voice-skepticism-on-voting-law.html
(internal quotation marks omitted).
10. Supreme Court Arguments Concluded in Shelby Co. Ala v. Holder,
N.J. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.nj.com/business/prnewswire/index.ssf?/

File: Rush – Final Edits

2014]

Created on: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM

Last Printed: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM

FEDERALISM, DIVERSITY, EQUALITY, AND JUDGES

123

Shelby County and Chief Justice Roberts’ question, along with the responses
it generated, could not be more poignantly illustrative of the lingering effects
slavery has had on the identity of both southern and northern states, as well as
the individuals living in those states.
Today, the tension between states’ interest in federalism, individuals’ interest in equality, and their shared interest in protecting their identities as full
participants in our democracy is evident in myriad contexts.11 Picture the
images of people suffering in Louisiana in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, or think of the executives sitting around a large walnut conference table at
a corporate board meeting on Wall Street.12 Consider the importance of race
and federalism in the contexts of gerrymandering,13 public education,14 health
care,15 juvenile justice,16 and prison incarceration.17 As these examples illustrate, the mental picture of who inhabits what space is historically and currently racial.
Part I of this Article highlights how state identity is central to Article
III because, in our democracy and consistent with the Tenth Amendment, the
state is the primary unit from which federalism is measured.18 States are
nj/story/?catSetID=7012&catID=819202&nrid=193582041&page=37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. See generally Boddie, supra note 6 (exploring how race defines many spaces, to the exclusion of people of color, often resulting in forms of discrimination that
the law overlooks).
12. Of the Fortune 500 CEOs, only 4.2% are racial minorities (blacks are 0.8%,
Asians are 1.8%, Latinos are 1.2%). See Crosby Burns, Kimberly Barton & Sophia
Kerby, The State of Diversity in Today’s Workforce: As Our Nation Becomes More
Diverse so Too Does Our Workforce, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 12, 2012),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/report/2012/07/12/11938/the-state-ofdiversity-in-todays-workforce/.
13. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1903 (2012) [hereinafter Stephanopoulous, Spatial Diversity].
14. See, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1
(2013); Jason P. Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of Students’ Belongings: A
Legal, Empirical, and Normative Analysis, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 367 (2013).
15. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., National Healthcare
Disparities Report 2013, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (2013),
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhdr13/2013nhdr.pdf .
16. See, e.g., Sophia Kerby, The Top 10 Most Startling Facts About People of
Color and Criminal Justice in the United States: A Look at the Racial Disparities
Inherent in Our Nation’s Criminal-Justice System, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 13,
2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2012/03/13/11351/thetop=
10-most-star (70% of students referred for discipline were black or Hispanic).
17. See, e.g., MICHELLE A LEXANDER, THE NEW J IM C ROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF C OLORBLINDNESS (2010); KATHERYN RUSSELLBROWN, THE C OLOR OF CRIME (NYU Press 2d ed. 2009).
18. See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124
HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (2010), for an interesting analysis of the role institutions other
than states (and cities) play in “Our Federalism.”
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identified by their geographic boundaries, the electoral college gives each
state a voice in the election of the President,19 and each state is represented in
Congress by two senators20 and a pro rata share of representatives in the
House.21 Each state also has its share of Article III judges,22 making these
judges essentially representatives of the states. Admittedly, the judges’ Article III life tenure and salary protection23 tend to camouflage the representational connection they have with the states and the people. Those protections
create an impression that the judges must be sealed off from the people precisely so the people cannot unduly influence the judges, who must be independent and impartial. In reality, the idea that Article III judges are representatives of the states and the people is found in the constitutional provisions
that empower the President to nominate judges to the Article III bench, provide for Senate confirmation of the judges,24 and even in those provisions that
provide for impeachment.25 The representational connections function to
preserve important constitutional values: separation of powers, federalism,
and individual liberties, including equal protection. This Article focuses on
the relationship among federalism, equality, diversity, and Article III.
As important as it is to have each state represented in the Article III judiciary, the Framers’ concern about states being biased in favor of their own
citizens in state court provided the rationale for Article III’s diversity jurisdiction.26 “Bias” in this context, of course, can only mean a shared “ideology”
based on a shared geography between a litigant and his or her home state
judge.27 Diversity jurisdiction allows a litigant to escape the potential unfair
bias in state court by bringing his or her claim in federal court.28
This Article explores this deep irony: states have a representational
right, consistent with federalism, to participate in the Article III judiciary
even as Article III provides individuals with a forum to escape state bias,
consistent with equality. The Framers acknowledged, and Congress goes to
great lengths to preserve, the principle that a state’s representation as a state
in the Article III judiciary is an important part of federalism. For example, a
state’s identity as a unified sovereign is a core aspect of federalism. With one
exception, no state in history has ever been required to disaggregate itself and
violate its unified sovereignty by being geographically divided across circuit

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2-3; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
28 U.S.C. §§ 81-144 (2012).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.A.
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court jurisdictions.29 Simultaneously, notwithstanding repeated proposals
over the years, Congress has declined to pass legislation that would eliminate
diversity jurisdiction.30 Thus, the irony persists.
In a different but similar vein, sometimes judges with certain identity
traits are accused of being unfairly biased against litigants who have different
identity traits. This is explored more fully in Part V, but a brief example is a
female judge who presides over a sexual harassment suit brought by a woman
against a man. Notwithstanding accusations of unfair bias against the judge
who is presumed to identify with the other woman, she has a right, consistent
with equality principles, to be a judge.
One way to begin to appreciate this irony is to gain a fuller understanding of identity and bias. Accordingly, in Part II, I focus on the concept of
“experiential bias” to distinguish it from the bias associated with diversity
jurisdiction or the bias leveled at the female judge in the sexual harassment
case. The meaning of “experiential bias” is largely self-evident; people make
decisions based on what they have learned from their experiences. This type
of bias is enjoyed by every human being, and is presumed to be exercised by
judges in a sound, reasonable, and fair manner. Myriad individual identity
traits inform a person’s experiential biases. Race is one of the most obvious
and is at the center of several recent cases, including Grutter31 and Shelby
County.32 But, as the Grutter Court acknowledged, an individual’s experiential bias is also informed by their geographic identity.33 In Part III, I explore
seven valuable lessons we can learn from Grutter about the relationship
among federalism, diversity, and equality. Just as the Article III judiciary
should be racially diverse as a matter of equality, so too must it be geographically diverse as a matter of federalism.
Distinguishing between the unfair bias associated with diversity jurisdiction and the experiential bias that is part of being human, and understanding
how they interact, is necessary to protecting both federalism and equality.
This is the main focus of Part IV of this Article. A growing body of identity

29. Martha Dragich, Back to the Drawing Board: Re-Examining Accepted Premises of Regional Circuit Structure, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 201, 244 (2011) (footnote omitted) (“[D]istrict boundaries have never crossed state lines.”). The one exception is Wyoming, which was split because of the special geography of Yellowstone National Park. See generally Brian C. Kalt, The Perfect Crime, 93 GEO. L.J.
675 (2005) (discussing the unique structure of the jurisdiction of the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming).
30. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective:
The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823,
1829 (2008) [hereinafter Purcell, Class Action].
31. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
32. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
33. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
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scholarship offers valuable insights about judicial bias.34 Identity scholarship
sprouted from the need to address structural obstacles within our legal system
that impede the attainment of equality by diverse groups.35 These groups
were historically unrepresented in the government because of their identities
and continue to fight for equality. This struggle is multi-faceted, but two
aspects are relevant to this Article. First, the struggle has shown that all public spaces, including seats on the judiciary, must be open to all citizens consistent with equal protection. Simply being included in the right to share public spaces, including the judiciary, is a matter of individual equality. I refer to
this as the “Individual Equality Principle.”
Second, identity scholarship exposes hidden biases in judicial decisions
that are presented as “neutral” but which favor historically privileged groups
and, concomitantly, maintain the inequality of historically subordinated
groups.36 For example, it is now well-recognized that people can unfairly
judge other people based on the phenomenon of “unconscious racism.”37
When a judge renders a decision that is rooted in unconscious racism, the
effect is harmful to all racial minority groups and to the entire justice system.
I refer to this as the “Group Equality Principle.”
More and more, the Equality Principles are expressed as a need to have
a diverse judiciary; however, it is important to emphasize that a desire to have
a diverse judiciary – like a diverse classroom – is rooted in basic equality and
representation principles. Insights gained from identity scholarship are helpful in understanding how geographic diversity on the Article III judiciary is
also supported by federalism. Part V of this Article analyzes experiential bias
in the context of federal jurisdiction (diversity and federal question) to
demonstrate the relationship between the Individual Equality and the Group
Equality Principles in the context of states’ rights to participate in Article III
judicial decision making. A diverse judiciary, including a geographically
diverse judiciary, is the key to avoiding unfair bias or, more realistically, the
key to ensuring that any unfair bias is shared relatively evenly among groups
or states. Critically important, a geographically diverse judiciary promotes
federalism and is consistent with the Equality Principles because experiential
bias that comes from being a citizen of a state adds a representational dimension to Article III judging.
Although this Article draws on identity scholarship to support the
argument that the Article III judiciary must be geographically diverse consistent with federalism and the Equality Principles, two important points need
to be made. This Article is not suggesting that geographic identity is more
important than or even as important as racial identity (or identity based on
34. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 380 (1987).
35. See id. at 326.
36. See Lawrence III, supra note 34.
37. Id.
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other traits). Rather, it is suggesting that there are remarkable similarities
between states and their claims of sovereignty, and individuals and their
claims of equality. Race is not the only identity trait to bridge these two areas, but it is the primary one. One only has to think of Jim Crow laws and the
lingering effects of racial segregation to imagine how the experiences of people on both sides of the color line shaped their identities. Today, the greatest
percentage of African Americans in the United States is in southern states, yet
Alabama did not have its first African-American Article III judge until
1980.38 These observations exemplify the important relationship among geography, federalism, equality, and Article III. A major accomplishment of
this Article is that it uniquely brings together these ostensibly unrelated concepts and bodies of scholarship.
Finally, Part VI of this Article focuses on diversity, particularly geographic diversity, and the Supreme Court. In fact, a primary impetus for researching and writing this Article was to explore how, over time, geography
plays less and less of a role in the nomination process. There are still nineteen states that have never been represented on the Court.39 Current members
of the Court Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas
served on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit prior to their appointments to the Supreme Court.40 Empirical studies
show that the Justices, in a statistically significant way, vote to affirm decisions coming from their home circuits.41 This suggests an unfair, albeit probably unconscious, bias at work. This example barely touches the ways in
which the Court has become less diverse, including geographically, a trend
that started in the 1970s.42 This is cause for concern because the lack of geographic diversity at the highest level of judicial review results in an overrepresentation of certain voices with similar experiential biases to the exclusion of others.43 The concerns that the Court is not racially, religiously, and
38. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm:
Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679,
733 (1999).
39. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice PreAppointment Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1163, 1163 n.82 (2012); see also
infra Part VII.A.2.
40. One could say this makes them less biased because D.C. is not a state. But
see Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not
the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1578 (2010) (suggesting that Justices who
are newcomers to the D.C. area are more influenced by the city’s “liberal bent” than
are Justices who already reside in D.C. when they are appointed).
41. See generally Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A.
Segal, Circuit Effects: How the Norm of Federal Judicial Experience Biases the Supreme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 834 (2009).
42. See Lee Epstein et al., The Increasing Importance of Ideology in the Nomination and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 609, 615
(2008); see also Barton, supra note 39, at 1172-73.
43. See infra Part VII.
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gender diverse as a matter of equality have been at the forefront of discussions about bias. This Article adds to that concern by showing how federalism and diversity are related to equality and representation principles.
Putting geographic diversity into the discussion about federalism, Article III, and the Equality Principles is important in itself. This Article offers a
timely opportunity to learn about this relationship because it is at the center of
several recent Supreme Court cases. For example, in the 2012 case Arizona
v. United States the Court decided that Arizona’s power as a sovereign is
limited with respect to its authority to regulate illegal immigration.44 This
term, in addition to Shelby County, the Court decided Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin45 – a case which bears on Grutter and the continuing need for
affirmative action. Although the Fisher Court did not overrule Grutter, it
might one day. But even if Grutter were overruled it would not affect the
rich and complicated relationship among equality, diversity, federalism, and
Article III. Rather, a deeper understanding of geography, identity, and bias
would continue to tie them all together.

II. FEDERALISM AND GEOGRAPHY
A. The Importance of States
“Federalism” means different things to different people.46 Beginning in
the 1970s,47 the term “federalism” has often been equated with “states’

44. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).
45. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
46. To the original Federalists, including the authors of the Federalist Papers,

Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and John Adams, it meant the United States should
have a strong, centralized government. See Victoria Nourse, Toward a “Due Foundation” for the Separation of Powers: The Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74
TEX. L. REV. 447, 448 (1996). Republicans, also known as Anti-Federalists, including Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and George Mason, feared that too strong a
national government would undermine the independence of the states. See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 236 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing the antifederalists in a historical context). The ebb and flow of this debate is a central part of
United States’ history, often played out in questions about Congress’ power to regulate commerce. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Over the
course of the ensuing 200 years, the Court has both broadened and narrowed the definition of commerce, always with a corresponding residual waxing and waning effect
on state power. Gregory W. Watts, Gonzales v. Raich: How to Fix a Mess of “Economic” Proportions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 545, 571 (2007). The struggle over slavery,
of course, was an instrumental aspect of this debate. See generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State
Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1015 (1997). Today, the
debate continues, not only in the area of commerce but also with respect to individual
rights and Congress’ enforcement power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
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rights,” ironically an understanding that more closely resembles what the
Anti-Federalists believed.48 Professor Heather Gerken aptly described federalism when she said “[it] has always been understood to be a multiple-headed
beast, with courts and scholars routinely deploying multiple and conflicting
accounts of what states do.”49 The tension that characterizes the different
understandings of federalism and the allocation of power between the national government and the states is seen even today, for example, in the debates
over gay marriage and abortion.
Regardless of how one defines federalism, the Framers clearly intended
for it to reflect the United States’ democratic commitment to maintaining a
constitutional boundary between the states and the federal government.
While the federal and state governments struggled, and continue to struggle,
with who is supposed to do what under the Constitution, the Framers insured
that the states would have their voices heard and be represented in the federal
government. Not only is no state excluded from electing its federal representatives, but the Constitution further ensures that each state’s voice is
equally represented.50 The Supreme Court acknowledged over 100 years ago
and reaffirmed in Shelby County that “[t]he constitutional equality of the
States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the
Republic was organized.”51 The Constitution has no favorite state; the concept of a “United States” is, by design, the coming together of a diverse group
of sovereign states to form a “more perfect Union.”52
Equally important to the Framers, federalism acknowledged and valued
the constitutional boundaries between states because each state is sovereign in
its own right. For example, the Constitution protects the sanctity of a state by
prohibiting another state from being established within an existing state’s
jurisdiction, and by prohibiting states or parts of states from joining together
to establish a new state without the consent of the states and Congress.53
Chief Justice John Marshall opined in McCulloch v. Maryland that “[n]o political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines
which separate the states, and of compounding the American people into one
ments, as Shelby County illustrates. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612,
2621 (2013).
47. See Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. R EV.
1191, 1193-94 (1977).
48. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law,
74 VA. L. R EV. 1141 (1988) (providing a detailed analysis of the post-Reconstruction
view of a “Federalist” versus “Nationalist” model of the relationship between state
and federal courts, or what the author calls “judicial federalism”).
49. Gerken, supra note 18, at 10.
50. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
51. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580
(1911) (federal government lacks power to locate state’s seat of government)).
52. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
53. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
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common mass.”54 Significantly, this opinion is embedded in the very case in
which he upheld Congress’ Commerce Clause power to establish a national
bank.55 From Chief Justice Marshall’s view, Congress’ Commerce Clause
power, particularly when combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause,
was virtually limitless, leaving little room for states to participate in the regulation of commerce.56 Given his broad reading of the Commerce Clause,
Chief Justice Marshall’s comment on the importance of each state is even
more remarkable.
The Framers solidified this important relationship between the Article
III judiciary and the states by providing in the Constitution that the Senate
must approve the President’s judicial nominees.57 The Framers had many
reasons for involving the Senate in the appointments process, including their
commitment to having each state’s voice heard on an equal basis.58 How to
protect smaller states from the larger states, of course, was a major focal point
of the Constitutional Convention.59 Senators, a geographically diverse group
by definition, could offer suggestions for candidates that otherwise might not
come to the President’s attention because of his somewhat geographic isolation at the seat of the government.60 Involving the Senate also ensured that
the larger states would not be able to “outshout” the smaller states and diminish their standing as equal participants in the nomination process.
Today, the selection of nominees to fill vacancies in the lower federal
courts is largely managed by the Senate through the use of judicial selection
committees situated in a senator’s home state.61 The President is not bound to
accept a nominee through this process, but the process does promote federalism.62 And, of course, great deference is given to the President’s constitutional authority to nominate justices for the Supreme Court, but again the
Framers ensured that states must approve the President’s choices.63

54. 17 U.S. 316, 403 (1819).
55. Id. at 424.
56. Chief Justice Marshall opined, “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the

scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional.” Id. at 421. Congress could not regulate commerce under a pretext, according to Justice Marshall, but it otherwise could regulate
even intrastate activity that affected interstate commerce. See id. at 423.
57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
58. Mary L. Clark, Advice and Consent vs. Silence and Dissent? The Contrasting
Roles of the Legislature in U.S. and U.K. Judicial Appointments, 71 LA. L. REV. 451,
464 (2011).
59. Id. at 464-65.
60. Id. at 465-66.
61. Id. at 467.
62. See id.
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Moreover, the importance of each state to the Article III judiciary is
readily apparent by studying the way in which Congress, using its Article III
power, initially structured the federal judiciary – a structure that continues to
be respected.64 If each federal court were pinpointed on a map of the United
States, one would see that each state has district courts65 and that geographically contiguous states66 are divided into geographic regions, each representing a circuit.67 The geographic organization of the Article III judiciary is
partly due to efficiency concerns, but is also a result of federalism and state
participation in protecting individual liberties. It would be unthinkable for a
state to have no federal district court judges. The Constitution and its Article
III judicial structure reflect a commitment to federalism’s principle that each
state has an important relationship not just with its federally elected representatives, but also with its non-elected federal judges who, in turn, protect
individual liberties.
But having an Article III judge presiding in its jurisdiction is only part
of the story. It would be unimaginable to have a Kansas resident sitting as a
federal judge in Nebraska even if the Kansas resident lived closer to the
courthouse than the Nebraska resident. With few exceptions, federal law
requires that district and appellate court judges reside in their districts.68
Residency requirements imposed by Congress on Article III judges
acknowledge the importance of the geographic connection those judges have
with the citizens in their own states and circuits. As important as the territorial boundaries are that distinguish one state from another, the Framers under64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
65. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-144 (2006).
66. Puerto Rico is part of the First Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). The Virgin

Islands are part of the Third Circuit. Id. The District of Canal Zone is part of the
Fifth Circuit. Id. Guam is part of the Ninth Circuit. Id.
67. Id. There are thirteen Courts of Appeals: First Circuit (Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Puerto Rico), Second Circuit (Connecticut, New
York, Vermont), Third Circuit (Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virgin Islands),
Fourth Circuit (Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia),
Fifth Circuit (District of Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas), Sixth Circuit
(Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee), Seventh Circuit (Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin), Eighth Circuit (Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota,
South Dakota), Ninth Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Guam), Tenth Circuit (Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming), Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida, Georgia), the
D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit. Id. The Federal Circuit has national appellate
jurisdiction over particular kinds of cases based on subject matter, for example, patents. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
68. For district court judges, see 28 U.S.C. § 134 (the exceptions for district court judges are the D.C. Circuit, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York; in the New York districts, however, the judges must reside within twenty miles
of their district). For court of appeals judges, see 28 U.S.C. § 44 (the exception is the
D.C. Circuit).
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stood, as do we today, that a state is more than just a convenient way of marking political boundaries. In other words, states are not just land masses; they
are political power bases. A state and its citizens are a community with a
shared identity, developed through the course of history as the citizens live
out their traditions and customs. Florida and New York share a common
national identity as sovereign states within the United States, but Florida’s
identity is separate and different from that of New York. Ask any Floridian
or New Yorker – even if they do not identify “ideologically” with their state –
and they will agree: it is one thing to be a Floridian and another to be a New
Yorker. The concept of geographic diversity reflects the reality that the United States is a union of fifty unique and sovereign states. As sovereigns, each
state is a “territorial community”69 that “arise[s] from the unique combinations of geography, interests, and identity that characterize particular places.”70 The Supreme Court recognizes the individuality of states, for example,
by calling them “labs of experimentation.”71
As sovereign communities, states adopt flags, mottos, birds, flowers,
and other symbols to distinguish themselves from each other and to establish
their unique identities. A significant part of a state’s identity is reflected in its
laws,72 which, to a large extent, establish or reflect a state’s norms.73
A state’s ability as a sovereign to establish who is or is not a citizen or a resident, conferring on those persons the various rights and privileges that attach
to state membership, is one of the most important aspects of a state’s
sovereignty.74 Perhaps one of the most poignant historical examples of this is
69. This term is commonly used in analyzing districting and gerrymandering
issues. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial
Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1385 (2012) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos,
Redistricting]. Unlike the districting area where geographic boundaries have to be
drawn, the geographic boundaries of states as “territorial communities” – the most
fundamental for federalism purposes – are established. Id. at 1386; see also Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, supra note 13, at 1922 n.74. (“community of interest” is
based on ideology and is different from territorial community).
70. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting, supra note 69, at 1385; see also Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, supra note 13, at 1974 n.288 (providing examples of communities that are bound together by culture and race).
71. This idea has been put forward by Justices Brandeis and O’Connor, among
others. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)) (“[Federalism] promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that ‘a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”).
72. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. R EV. 249,
316-19 (1992).
73. Id. at 318-19.
74. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. R EV. 515, 52627 (2009).
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the Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, in which the Court held that
Missouri law rather than federal law governed the question of whether Mr.
Scott was a free man after traveling to a free state.75 Laws establishing state
membership, of course, can be unconstitutional because they interfere with
Congress’ power to regulate in a field such as immigration, as they were in
the recent cases in Arizona.76 State membership laws can also violate the
Equality Principles.
An individual’s constitutional rights can be denied by a state even when
the individual is clearly a state citizen. The internment of Japanese Americans during World War II is a poignant example. In Korematsu v. United
States,77 the Supreme Court upheld the detention of Japanese American citizens on the sole basis of race, a clear abridgment of their Equal Protection
and Due Process rights.78 Notice that issues of race and ethnicity gave rise to
all of these iconic examples.
Importantly, as the Arizona immigration cases illustrate, while the Supremacy Clause requires state laws to be constitutional there is often a lot of
leeway for individual states to function, to be “labs of experimentation,” in
ways that reflect their citizens’ norms without violating the Constitution.79
For example, a state might not provide for the death penalty as a form of punishment in its criminal justice system even though the Supreme Court has
held that imposing the death penalty does not violate the Constitution.80 Being a “death penalty” or a “non-death penalty” state is one part of a state’s
identity. Today, a fight between the states and the courts is being waged over
whether states can maintain their identities as “no gun regulation” states.81
States that want stricter gun regulations don that identity as well.
To summarize thus far, state citizens, though also drawn together as a
political unit because of their sovereignty, are drawn together by their more
holistic sovereign identity that represents their histories, traditions, and cultures. Our history of slavery and racial inequality continues to shape the
identity of many states, particularly the southern states. State citizens generally are proud to be members of their state even if they do not identify with
particular aspects of their state’s identity. Geographic identity is as real as it
is mysterious. The mystery surrounding what it means to be from different
75. 60 U.S. 393, 452 (1856) (finding that although citizenship for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction in federal court is determined by federal law, the status of an
individual as property or person is determined by the law of the state in which he
resides or is owned).
76. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
77. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
78. Id. at 219-20.
79. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2518-19.
80. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
81. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); Jordan E.
Pratt, Uncommon Firearms as Obscenity, 81 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013).
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states is what federalism is all about; it also is at the center of the need for
diversity jurisdiction.

B. Diversity Jurisdiction
Diversity jurisdiction has always been controversial. Professor Charles
Warren, one of the most notable scholars on federal jurisdiction, made an
observation about the earliest debates over diversity jurisdiction that is worth
reflection. He said: “There was no part of the Federal jurisdiction which had
sustained so strong an attack from the Anti-Federalists, or which had received
so weak a defense from the Federalists as that which gave them power over
‘controversies between citizens of different states.’”82 The Anti-Federalists’
struggle to keep diversity cases in state courts suggests a possible distrust of
federal judges to adjudicate state issues. It also suggests the Anti-Federalists’
preference for their state judges to adjudicate cases involving their own citizens. Both suggestions are consistent with the most common perception
about the need for diversity jurisdiction: bias.83
Ask first year law students why diversity jurisdiction exists and the answer is likely to be that the Framers provided for it in Article III because they
feared state judges would be biased against non-resident litigants.84 In other
words, the perceived need for diversity jurisdiction rests on the premise that it
allows an out-of-state litigant to escape the bias of a state judge who identifies with the in-state litigant simply because they are from the same state.
The shared geographic identities of the judge and the in-state litigant could
theoretically prevent the non-resident litigant from getting a fair trial.
As ingrained as this first year law school lesson is, no definitive answer
seems to exist as to why the Framers provided for diversity jurisdiction involving citizens of different states, although it is clear that the whole grant of
diversity jurisdiction in Article III was premised on state courts favoring their
own litigants in party-based cases. In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton
expressed his opinion:
[T]he reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in
which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks
for itself. No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in
any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias. This
principle has no inconsiderable weight in designating the federal
courts as the proper tribunals for the determination of controversies
between different States and their citizens . . . The laws may have
even prejudged the question, and tied the courts down to decisions in
82. Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1829 n.19 (quoting Charles Warren,
New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49,
81 (1923)).
83. See Warren, supra note 82, at 83.
84. Id.
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favor of the grants of the State to which they belonged. And even
where this had not been done, it would be natural that the judges, as
men, should feel a strong predilection to the claims of their own gov85
ernment.

Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux
reflects a similar sentiment:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every
description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the
possible fears and apprehensions of suits, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a
86
citizen, or between citizens of different states.

Feeding the bias premise is a common perception that state court judges
lack judicial independence and are subject to political influence because they
want to be reelected or reappointed.87 In a recent article, however, Professor
Brian Fitzpatrick persuasively demonstrates the fallacy of this assumption.88
His work supports the view that, historically, “state court judges were elected
and the vast majority of them enjoyed life tenure.”89 Most state judges, in
other words, historically enjoyed the same protections of judicial independence as Article III judges. In fact, many federal judges at that time had experience as state judges.90 Accordingly, when Congress initially provided for
diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789, it had little, if any, reason
to be concerned about unfair judicial geographic bias.91
Congress and Hamilton were concerned, however, about state legislatures enacting laws that favored their own citizens and state juries being unfairly biased against creditors.92 Diversity jurisdiction allowed out-of-state

85. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro
ed., 2009).
86. 5 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
87. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal JurisdictionStripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA.
L. REV. 839, 842 (2012).
88. See id. at 862.
89. Id. at 893.
90. Id. at 891.
91. See id. at 886-88.
92. Id. at 890; see also Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument:
The Jury and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
997 (2007) (suggesting jury bias was of greater importance to the Framers than
judicial bias when deciding that federal courts, rather than state courts, should hear
diversity claims).
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litigants to avoid those biases. Prior to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,93 out-ofstate litigants were able to avoid unfavorable state substantive law because
under Swift v. Tyson Article III judges sitting in diversity cases could ignore
unclear state laws and apply a general federal common law.94 Even the
Framers thought this was constitutional.95 Moreover, defendants avoided
state juries who were biased against creditors by seeking out the “more urban
and pro-creditor federal jury pools.”96 These more complex justifications for
diversity jurisdiction generally are not part of the first year Civil Procedure
course and students continue to learn the much simpler geographic identity
bias justification.
Questioning whether the need to escape bias ever justified diversity jurisdiction, some scholars and practitioners suggest that even if bias was the
original reason, today it is no longer applicable.97 Specifically, being able to
avoid local bias by filing a suit in, or removing it to, federal court to avoid
unfavorable state substantive law has been obviated by Erie and its progeny.98
From the Erie line of cases, and consistent with the Rules of Decision Act,99
it is now clear that a federal judge hearing a diversity case is not free to ignore state substantive law.100 Whether federal juries are less susceptible to
local bias than state juries is an interesting question. Notice that the historical
concern about jury bias was premised on the idea that both state and federal
jury pools were biased, but for different reasons associated with geography
and federalism.
In any event, many scholars and practitioners suggest that diversity jurisdiction should be abolished.101 Astonishingly, this is not a modern debate;
it has been going on since the Civil War.102 As Professor Edward Purcell
documents, some scholars take the position that diversity jurisdiction is theoretically indefensible;103 however, practitioners have successfully lobbied to
keep Congress from abolishing it.104 From the practitioners’ point of view,
escaping potential local bias is a legitimate reason to keep diversity jurisdic-

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 87, at 890.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 890-93.
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
Id. (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.”)
101. See Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1829.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1833-35.
104. See id. at 1848.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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tion.105 Indeed, attorneys have testified before Congress to express their concerns about this problem.106 One attorney said, “I remove qualified cases to
federal court . . . to avoid being ‘home-towned’ by the judge and/or jury.”107
Some practitioners also contend that their clients’ needs are better served in
federal court, and the attorneys themselves also prefer a federal forum.108
There are many reasons an attorney or client might prefer a federal forum to a
state forum.109 In any event, a debate over the question of whether Congress
should abolish diversity jurisdiction is intractable and variables other than the
issue of local bias – such as expense and efficiency – enter into the discussion. Ultimately, whether Congress should abolish diversity jurisdiction is a
policy question, and thus far those in favor of keeping it have prevailed.110
Much harder to answer, and more relevant to the local bias issue, is the
question of whether Congress actually has the constitutional authority to abolish diversity jurisdiction. For purposes of this Article, one possible answer is
that Congress does not have the authority to abolish diversity jurisdiction if a
litigant has a right, perhaps as a matter of due process, to avoid the potential
unfair local bias of a state court by choosing to have their case heard before
an Article III judge. This view posits that the choice to go to a federal court
under diversity jurisdiction is constitutionally protected by Article III and
Congress thus cannot take it away.
As long as Congress does not abolish diversity jurisdiction, a definitive
answer to whether it would have the authority to do so will remain elusive.
Moreover, the association of diversity jurisdiction with the need to escape
local bias persists even though there is scant, if any, empirical evidence to
support the bias theory.111 Professor Purcell aptly describes the current understanding of why diversity jurisdiction was created, stating, “The historical
record gave sparse indication why the framers and ratifiers adopted the jurisdiction, and the scattered bits of evidence suggested only that they intended it
to provide protection against some kind of bias or unfairness, real or anticipated, that non-residents might encounter in the states.”112 Moreover, to the
105. See id.
106. See id. at 1848 & n.89 (citing testimony before Congress).
107. Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifica-

tions for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 145 (2009).
108. See Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1846.
109. Id. at 1846; see also Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 138-39 (stating that a party
might prefer federal or state procedural rules, for example).
110. Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1841-45, 1847-48 (illustrating the
detailed history of attempts to abolish diversity jurisdiction).
111. Id. at 1847-48.
112. Id. at 1833 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Debra Lyn Bassett,
The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 119, 123-24
(2003) (suggesting there is scant evidence to support the theory that diversity jurisdiction was created to avoid local bias, but neither is there evidence to support another
reason for creating it).
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extent bias is a concern, federal judges also are prone to it.113 What is significant to highlight is that the perceived need to escape bias is centered solely on
local bias associated with the state as a geographic unit.
This reality invites a closer examination of the concept of “bias.” Just as
bias is a central concern in an exploration of states, federalism, and Article
III, it also is a central concern in an exploration of individuals, equality, and
Article III. Justice O’Connor’s comment from Grutter suggests that she
agrees, at least to the extent that the experiences one has growing up in a region influences a person’s views in much the same way that being a racial
minority influences one’s views.114 Significantly, this Article builds on and
strengthens the connections among federalism, equality, diversity, and Article
III by exploring what “bias” means in the context of federalism and equality.

III. BIAS
“Bias” tends to be an emotionally charged word, often associated with
prejudice and unfairness. That is the sentiment behind diversity jurisdiction.
However, the dictionary also defines “bias” as a “preference.”115 Having a
preference for something does not carry the same negative implications.
Accordingly, when questions about bias arise the real concern is not
whether a judge (or a jury) is biased or has preferences, because they all do.
This is referred to as “experiential” bias, meaning that people make decisions
based on the knowledge they acquire from the experiences they have.116 This
is explored more fully below, but note that state judges and Article III judges
have common geographic identities because of the way the Article III judiciary is structured, consistent with federalism.117 Naturally, experiential bias is
informed by myriad factors and influences in a person’s life.118 This Article
posits that geography – like race, sex, sexual orientation, and other identity
traits – is an instrumental factor in shaping a person’s views.
This observation is supported by showing how concerns about bias in
the context of diversity jurisdiction are remarkably similar to concerns about
bias in the context of equality. Even though many state judges and Article III
judges share similar geographic identities, states nevertheless have a federalism right to be represented on the Article III bench. Similarly, historically
113. Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1847-49.
114. 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (“Just as growing up in a particular region or hav-

ing particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too
is one’s own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own,
in which race unfortunately still matters.”).
115. Bias, Collins English Dictionary – Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition
Definition of Bias.
116. Experiential, Collins English Dictionary – Complete & Unabridged 10th
Edition Definition of Experiential.
117. See infra Part III.B.
118. See infra Part III.B.
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disenfranchised groups who have been the target of unfair bias (prejudice)
also have an equality right to be represented on the Article III bench. This
analogy is important because it exposes the similarities and differences between two constitutional values that are deeply associated with Article III.

A. Questions of Fairness
Determining whether a judge is fair is a delicate evaluation. What information judges, especially Article III judges, rely on or should rely on to
form their opinions is the concern of much debate and scholarly attention.119
Are judges too ideological, wedded too much to originalism,120 or not wedded
enough? Recently, scholars have studied the extent to which judges rely on
“intuition.”121 Reasonable people will disagree over the “right” answers to
some of these questions. Moreover, the debates over what is appropriate or
inappropriate for judges to rely on in their decision making are not likely to
end. However, two points about what judges cannot rely on as they make
decisions are generally uncontested by reasonable people.

1. Conflicts of Interest
First, judges cannot rely on their own abilities to avoid being unfairly
biased in cases in which they have a conflict of interest with one of the parties. No matter how “good” a judge is, his or her ability to be fair in such
situations will always be doubted and even the appearance of a conflict of
interest ethically requires recusal.122 In other words, a conflict of interest, or
the appearance of a conflict of interest, deems a judge unfair. Justice Elena
Kagan, for example, recused herself from several cases pending before the
Court, including the Arizona and Fisher cases, because she had been involved
with them in her position as U.S. Solicitor General.123

119. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and
the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739 (2013) (discussing originalism and
non-originalism and what each group relies on to form its opinions).
120. See id. (offering a way to harmonize the debate over originalism versus nonoriginalism as the “right” method of constitutional interpretation).
121. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (stating that federal judges are required to recuse themselves “in any proceeding in which [their] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned”).
123. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students (Sponsored by Bloomberg
Law): Justice Kagan’s Recusals, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 9:50 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-justice-kagans-recusals/ (stating that Justice Kagan recused herself from
twenty-eight out of seventy-five cases her first term).
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2. Prejudice
Second, judges who are openly prejudiced against certain classes of
people or particular issues also cannot rely on their own abilities to escape
their prejudices in any given case. Being prejudiced is different from having
a conflict of interest. “Prejudice” is used to mean an unfair bias where that
bias is built on stereotypes or is anchored in negative feelings, perhaps even
animosity, toward an individual or a group. A judge who is a member of the
Ku Klux Klan, for example, cannot judge a race discrimination case fairly.
The Court has held that legislation enacted out of prejudice124 or animus125 is
unreasonable and unconstitutional. Poignantly, this formed the basis for the
majority’s conclusion in United States v. Windsor that the Defense of Marriage Act “is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and
effect to disparage and to injure those [same sex couples] whom the State, by
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”126
Similarly, judicial decisions based on prejudiced views are unreasonable. For example, in Palmore v. Sidoti, the Supreme Court remanded a case
involving a Caucasian family, in which the state judge gave custody of a child
to the father because the mother had cohabited with and then married an African-American man following the parents’ divorce.127 The Court feared that
decisions by a judge based on race were “more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns.”128 Some might argue that, with respect
to judges being prejudiced, there is a difference between a state judge and an
Article III judge. Because state judges are elected or appointed by an elected
official (the governor), some might argue that the citizens of a state have a
right to elect, directly or indirectly, a prejudiced judge. Undoubtedly, this is
true. In fact, even legislation that is unconstitutional because it is based on
prejudice has, on occasion, received a vote of support by a majority of the
state citizens.129 Again, that is part of the democratic process. But if a state
judge renders a prejudiced opinion in violation of the Equality Principles, an
appellate state judge is obligated to strike it down. If the Supreme Court is
the ultimate arbiter in such cases, it also has the constitutional duty to correct
the unfairness, as it did in Palmore.130 The checks and balances built into the
124. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450
(1985) (requiring special use permit for home for “mentally retarded” was motivated
by irrational prejudice because other institutions not required to get permits).
125. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (holding that
Colorado Amendment Two denying equal protection to gays motivated by animus
is unconstitutional).
126. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
127. 466 U.S. 429, 430-31, 434 (1984).
128. Id. at 432.
129. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing antimiscegenation laws).
130. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434.
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judicial process ideally weed out prejudiced judicial decisions. Thus, while
state citizens can use their voice to elect prejudiced judges, ultimately that
voice will be drowned out by application of the Equality Principles at the
appellate level.
Is this analysis different for Article III judges? Again, because the President and Senate, both majority institutions, are the guardians of the Article
III bench, it is possible for prejudiced judges to be confirmed as Article III
judges. Recently, Judge Edith Jones of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit was accused of being racially biased because she allegedly said that African Americans and Hispanics are “predisposed to crime.”131
Because of complaints challenging her ability to be fair, Chief Justice Roberts
ordered a formal review of her record by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.132
This example highlights how delicate issues of judicial bias can be.
Reasonable people will disagree about whether Judge Jones’ comment reflects racial bias. But the call for an official review indicates how important
it is for judges to be fair and to be perceived as such, regardless of “popular”
sentiments. In the nomination process for Article III judges, a known prejudice typically is a severe handicap and dooms a nominee’s chances of successful confirmation. President Nixon’s nominations of both Clement
Haynsworth of South Carolina and Harold Carswell of Florida failed because
both men strongly supported racial segregation.133 Reasonable people agree
that a nominee who openly opposes the Equality Principles is unfit.
Moreover, as “good” as a judge is, and no matter how much a judge
might think that he or she is able to put aside his or her prejudices, prejudices
often operate on people in ways of which they are not even aware.134 Critically important, no reasonable person would accept that a prejudiced judge
could render a fair decision in a case that involved people or issues that
aroused the judge’s prejudices. For example, regardless of the results of the
D.C. Circuit’s formal review of Judge Jones, her integrity as a fair judge who
is not racially prejudiced is impugned. The “experiential bias” of most African Americans and Hispanics will mean that these groups are likely to be
especially critical of her impartiality. The integrity of our judicial system
depends on people believing that it treats individuals fairly and equally.

131. Stephanie Condon, Conservative Judge Edith Jones up for Rare Review,
CBS NEWS (June 13, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_16257589149/conservative-judge-edit-jones-up-for-rare-review/.
132. Id.
133. See infra notes 349-350 and accompanying text.
134. See infra Part VI.
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B. Experiential Bias
Just as reasonable people agree that judges with conflicts of interest or
known prejudices are likely to adjudicate unfairly and therefore should recuse
themselves in appropriate cases, reasonable people also agree that judges are
human beings whose experiences influence their views. Indeed, the basis for
a prejudiced view, which is unreasonable, or a non-prejudiced view, which is
reasonable, stems from an individual’s experiences. For example, a person
might have a negative experience with a person from a different racial group
and unreasonably extrapolate from that experience to harbor negative sentiments toward other people in that racial group, or a person might be taught
unreasonable and untrue lessons about particular groups. Sometimes learning
such lessons is intentional, which is consistent with someone being knowingly prejudiced. Some parents, for example, teach their children to be racist.
However, sometimes learning unreasonable and untrue lessons can be done
unwittingly, and by very loving and equality-minded people. These kinds of
lessons form the basis for unconscious bias, which is different from prejudice,
but is also unfair.
Given that all people, including judges, are experientially biased, it is
important to understand the concept of “unconscious bias.” Identity scholars
explore how a judge’s unconscious bias – that is, a bias the judge is not even
aware he or she has – can influence the judge’s decision making in ways that
promote inequality.135 How someone can be “unconsciously” biased is not
easy to understand. Continuing to use racial equality as an example, modern
studies and legal jurisprudence136 accept the existence and legitimacy of the
concept of “unconscious racism.” 137 Professor Charles Lawrence articulated
the concept:

135. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist
Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 500 (1998) (discussing how the visibility factor in
the test for application of heightened scrutiny may accidentally promote inequality
because those not discriminated against may not understand that utilizing visibility as
a criterion for protection is impliedly demanding that “invisible” groups hide).
136. See Developments in the Law – Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1472, 1559-60 (1998). The seminal article on unconscious racism is The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism. See Lawrence
III, supra note 34.
137. See, e.g., PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://www.projectimplicit.net/index.html (last
visited Mar. 13, 2014). “Project Implicit” at Harvard University offers an online test
that anyone can take to better understand the concept of implicit bias, including their
own. Id. It also has an extensive bibliography on recent studies about implicit bias.
Project Implicit Publications, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://www.projectimplicit.net
/papers.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
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A crucial factor in the process that produces unconscious racism is the
tacitly transmitted cultural stereotype. . . . [T]he lesson is not explicit:
It is learned, internalized, and used without an awareness of its source.
Thus, an individual may select a white job applicant over an equally
qualified black and honestly believe that this decision was based on
observed intangibles unrelated to race. . . . He is unaware of the
learned stereotype that influenced his decision. Moreover, he has
probably also learned an explicit lesson of which he is very much
aware: Good, law-abiding people do not judge others on the basis of
138
race.

Meanwhile, Justice O’Connor opined in one of her dissents that “[i]t is by
now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white
jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials,
perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence.”139
A judge who is openly racist, of course, falls into the prejudiced judge
category. A judge who is not even aware that he or she falls into the unconscious racism arena typically is an equality-minded person who would never
think of him or herself as racially prejudiced. Moreover, the equality-minded
spectrum is broad. For example, most people might consider a person who
uses the N-word racist; however, the controversy surrounding Paula Deen’s
admitted use of this word exemplifies how varied the views are on even this
point.140 One person, identified as a white man, in support of forgiving Ms.
Deen, opined, “Everybody in the South over 60 used the N-word at some
time or the other in the past.”141 Another supporter, an African-American
woman, said, “I get it, believe me . . . But what’s hard for people to understand is that she didn’t mean it as racist . . . [t]hat’s not what’s in her heart.
She’s just from another time.”142 Understanding what is or is not “racist,” of
course, is one thing. But a decision based on unconscious racism is clearly
unfair. This is the heart of identity scholarship’s endeavor: to expose the
hidden biases that otherwise come from “reasonable” people.
Moreover, unconscious unfair biased decision making, of course, is not
limited to the area of race relations. The tendency to stereotype, consciously
or unconsciously, is something most humans do. Modern studies demonstrate
that most of us make decisions based on stereotypes in a matter of a split sec138. Lawrence III, supra note 34, at 343 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
140. See, e.g., Ann Oldenburg, Fans Support and Defend Paula Deen, USA

TODAY (June 24, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/
2013/06/24/fans-support-defend-paula-deen/2451559/.
141. Kim Severson, At Georgia Restaurant, Patrons Jump to Defend a Chef from
Her Critics, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2013, at A19, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2013/06/23/us/in-the-south-many-are-willing-to-forgive-deens-racialmisstep.html?pagewanted?3Dall&_r=1&.
142. Id.

File: Rush – Final Edits

144

Created on: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM

[Vol. 79

ond, perhaps without even knowing it.143 Fortunately, our legal system, and
in particular the Supreme Court, is increasingly sensitive to the need to eschew stereotypes because they undermine the Equality Principles.144 Justice
O’Connor’s quotation exemplifies that we are making progress.
Thus, to be experientially biased – to have a point of view – because
of one’s identity is not cause for recusal; no one would be able to be a judge
if it were. Experiential bias, then, is a natural part of judging. However,
to be a fair judge requires a willingness to consider the possibility that
one might be unconsciously biased.145 Helping make equality-minded and
loving people aware of this possibility is an enormous and daunting challenge. Speaking from my own experiences as a white person who cares deeply about racial equality and who has devoted her whole life to helping achieve
it, I did not realize how unconscious racism worked in my own mind until I
fell in love with my black daughter and started to bear witness simply living
our daily lives.146

IV. GRUTTER’S LESSONS ABOUT FEDERALISM, DIVERSITY,
EQUALITY, AND ARTICLE III
The inclusion of individuals and groups in the democratic process evidences a respect for their rights to have their experiential biases influence
learning and decision making. While their inclusion is about representation
and equality, it often is couched in terms of “diversity.” In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the
University of Texas unlawfully denied the equal protection rights of Abigail
Fisher, a self-identified white applicant, because of her race when it denied
her application for admission.147 Under the University’s admissions policy,
University officials consider race as one factor among many in its efforts to
admit a “diverse” class.148 As mentioned earlier, the Court upheld the constitutionality of this type of admissions policy in Grutter.149
143. See generally B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and
Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH . SCI. 287 (2006).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). In striking
down the Virginia Military Institute’s exclusion of women as a denial of equal protection, Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority that VMI’s justification for the exclusion
“must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females.” Id.
145. See infra notes 256-257 and accompanying text (where Justice Sotomayor
emphasized that she would strive to be impartial and fair even though she had said
that her experiences as a Latina did influence her views).
146. I detail this in my book, SHARON E. R USH, LOVING ACROSS THE C OLOR
LINE: A W HITE ADOPTIVE MOTHER LEARNS ABOUT RACE (2000).
147. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013).
148. Id. at 2416-17.
149. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
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The Fisher Court, in a 7 to 1 decision,150 held that both lower courts
erred by giving too much deference to the University’s assertion that it
operated in “good faith” in administering the admissions policy.151
The Fisher Court agreed with Grutter that it is a university’s decision whether to consider race in its admissions policy in order to admit a diverse class,
but once it has made that decision and it is challenged in court a judge must
determine if the university’s method of achieving this objective meets strict
scrutiny.152 The university has the burden of proof to establish that the method it chose to achieve its goal of diversity is narrowly tailored.153 In other
words, “[t]he reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable
race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”154 Understanding the relationship between equality and diversity helps to
distinguish between prejudice and experiential bias. Toward this end, and
because Fisher affirms Grutter, it is useful to analyze seven valuable lessons
from these cases.

A. Lesson One: Diversity and Equality Are Related
The Grutter and Fisher Courts’ affirmation of the connection between
diversity and equality is significant and related to the major point of this Article. Just as federalism has strong connections to race and geography, the
most natural and logical starting point for understanding equality is in the
context of race and racial equality. The concept of diversity found its way
into Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence through the Equal Protection
Clause.155 More fully, the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution to establish the rights of the newly-freed slaves to be full citizen participants in our democracy.156 It marked the beginning of our democracy’s
commitment to include the voices of racial minorities, particularly the newly
freed slaves, in shaping the law. They became free to represent themselves.
In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court, in its first interpretation of the Four150. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito, Breyer, Scalia, Sotomayor, and Thomas. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at
2414. Justice Ginsburg dissented and Justice Kagan recused herself due to a conflict
of interest. Id.; see also Adam Liptak, Justices Step Up Scrutiny in College Entry,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2013, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/us/affirmative-action-decision.html?_r=0.
151. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (“The District Court and Court of Appeals confined the strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University’s
good faith in its use of racial classifications . . . .”).
152. Id. at 2421.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2420.
155. See U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1.
156. See generally Paul Finkelman, The Historical Context of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 389 (2004).
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teenth Amendment, opined that if the Equal Protection Clause was intended
to protect anyone, surely it was intended to protect the newly-freed slaves
from discrimination on the basis of race.157
Since Slaughterhouse, it is clear that all racial groups are protected from
discrimination. This seems perfectly logical because all people have a race.
But it was not until Allan Bakke, a self-identified white person, challenged
the University of California Davis School of Medicine’s admissions policy,
which set aside sixteen of 100 seats for racial minorities, that diversity in
public education became a popular concern about racial equality.158 While
the Court held that the set-aside program denied Bakke equal protection,159
the opinion provided much fodder for the Justices about the value to U.C.
Davis of having a racially diverse medical school class160 and what level of
review the policy had to meet in order to pass constitutional muster.161 Some
Justices distinguished affirmative action laws that were intended to help racial
minorities from racial discrimination laws that hurt minorities.162 A plurality
held that this distinction justified applying an intermediate standard of review
to affirmative action policies.163 Justice Powell, voting with the plurality,
wrote separately to opine that the set-aside policy, because it was a racial
classification, should be subject to strict scrutiny just like any classification
based on race.164 Moreover, while he would not have upheld the set-aside, he
did think it would be constitutional for a public college to consider an applicant’s race as one factor among many in a holistic review of an application –
in essence, the holding adopted by Grutter.165 “Diversity” thus became a
compelling state interest that can be pursued as long as a public university
does not violate the Individual Equality Principle.166

B. Lesson Two: Diversity Overshadows Equality
The Bakke and Grutter Courts paved the way for the concept of “diversity” ultimately to substitute for “equality” in the context of race and public
university admissions processes.167 Ironically, the Grutter Court did this
primarily by relying on Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bakke and affirming
the constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School’s holistic
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872).
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275-79 (1978).
Id. at 320.
Id. at 312-16.
Id. at 288-90.
Id. at 363-68.
Id. at 359-62.
Id. at 290, 320.
See id. at 318.
See id. at 314-15.
See Sharon E. Rush, Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection Analysis, 6 AM. U. J. OF GENDER & THE L. 43 (1998).
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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definition of “diversity.”168 While a holistic definition of diversity includes
racial diversity, diversity is different from, albeit related to, equality. This
shift in focus confuses the significance of the difference between the Individual Equality Principle and the Group Equality Principle even as it simultaneously acknowledges the importance of each. In the affirmative action context, the Individual Equality Principle is affirmed because each individual is
entitled to equal protection. Typically, the plaintiff in such cases is white.
On the other hand, the Group Equality Principle is affirmed because the Court
held that admitting a diverse class, including a racially diverse class, is a
compelling state interest. Typically, racial diversity is achieved when racial
minorities are included in a predominantly white class.
Both Equality Principles, however, are overshadowed by the very concept of diversity. This is because most characteristics of an individual, as
valuable as they are and as much as they contribute to diversity, have nothing
to do with equality. Consider talent; undoubtedly, the talents that applicants
bring to the university enrich the school’s environment. If a college wants an
athletics program, it has to admit applicants who play sports. Accordingly, it
is easy to see the link between talent and diversity; however, that does not
mean that there is a constitutional link. The most talented football player
does not have a claim of talent discrimination if he is denied admission to a
public university while an applicant with no football talent is admitted. This
is true even if the university sets aside a certain number of seats and scholarships for applicants who do not play football.
An applicant from State A who is denied admission to Public University
C when an applicant from State B is admitted would similarly not have
a geographic discrimination suit even if the applicant from State A was clearly “more qualified” according to the University’s admissions metrics. Significantly, though geographic identity is constitutionally important, and in this
way is more like race than talent, it is not constitutionally protected. Recall
Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutter in which she linked geographic and
racial identity and opined that both are important and shape an individual’s
views169 – once the focus shifts from equality to diversity, however, anything
that makes an individual unique can be thrown into the diversity melting pot.
The Equality Principles remind us, however, that no matter what identity
traits might go into that pot, “racial identity” clearly cannot be taken out of it.
Unfortunately, there is a huge negative consequence that results from
this shift – the increased commodification of racial identity. Professor Nancy
Leong’s recent article entitled “Racial Capitalism”170 explains that valuing

168. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307-09 (2003).
169. Id. at 333.
170. Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. R EV. 2151 (2013). Prof.

Leong states, “In a society preoccupied with diversity, nonwhiteness is a valued
commodity. And where that society is founded on capitalism, it is unsurprising that
the commodity of nonwhiteness is exploited for its market value.” Id. at 2154; see
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diversity just for the sake of increasing the number of racial minorities in a
white institution privileges whites.171 For example, it allows white institutions to hold themselves out as non-racist.172 Furthermore, the justifications
for this shift suggest that the inclusion of racial minorities in white classrooms is to benefit white students who “need” to learn about racial differences to enhance their own chances for success in the real world.173 I agree
with Professor Leong that the current understanding by most whites and
white institutions that diversity is valuable is somewhat superficial.174 If
equality were truly the reason for valuing diversity, then institutions would
work hard to change their cultures.175 Because diversity has become so prevalent, however, the discourse is unlikely to shift back to equality. It is critically important, however, to remember and to stress that racial diversity is
firmly rooted in the Equality Principles. It is from this perspective that I suggest that the reasoning of Grutter is premised on having the experiential bias
of all students, including racial minority students, engaged in classroom discussions consistent with the Group Equality Principle.
This Article suggests that federalism insists that, like racial identity, geographic identity cannot be taken out of the melting pot with respect to the
Article III judiciary and its role in protecting the equality of states as well as
the Equality Principles.

C. Lesson Three: Individual and Group Identity Inform
Experiential Biases
An individual’s experiences relate not just to what the individual experiences as an individual, but also to what he or she experiences as a member of
various groups. The concepts of individual identity and group identity are
both related and distinct. The Individual Equality Principle and the Group
Equality Principle highlight the importance of this distinction.
Mediating the distinction between individual and group identity is challenging, because it is human nature to group people – to stereotype or “essentialize” them – based on their shared identity traits. But stereotyping is unfair. It is common knowledge, for example, that Justice Thomas is criticized
by people who assert that he does not “think like a black man” because of his

Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale
on White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
171. Leong, supra note 170 at 2155.
172. Id. at 2179.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 2169-70. This is what Prof. Leong calls the “thin” version of diversity,
distinguishing it from the “thick” version which “views diversity as a prerequisite to
cross-racial interaction, which fosters inclusivity and improves cross-racial relationships, thereby benefiting institutions and individuals of all races.” Id. at 2169.
175. See id. at 2170-71.
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conservative views.176 This criticism, of course, essentializes all blacks and
assigns each a single voice that speaks the “black view.” This is ridiculously
unfair on the individual level because each individual’s experiential bias is
unique to that individual’s life experiences. Even identical twins, raised in
the same environment, are still independent thinkers.177 It is fundamentally
unfair to expect them to be of the same mind as if they were one person.
Simultaneously, group membership is relevant to the influences of experiential bias because an individual’s group membership has a powerful influence on the individual’s life experiences. A black man, for example, has a far
greater chance of being stopped by the police than a white woman. In the
aftermath of the shooting of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman, President Obama shared on national television that he had been the target of racial
profiling and even commented that “Trayvon Martin could have been me 35
years ago.”178 Parents of white children do not have to confront the unfair
reality of racial profiling. This reality, although unfair, says nothing about
how an individual black man who is pulled over would vote for a political
candidate or evaluate a legal problem. This also helps in understanding why
it is important to have a “critical mass” of racial minorities in a classroom.
While each individual’s experiences are unique to the individual, group
members share a common bond about what it means to be a member of that
group. Notwithstanding his conservative views that do not align with majority black politics, Justice Thomas emphatically claimed his black identity in
Grutter when he quoted Frederick Douglass’ plea to abolitionists to leave
blacks alone and let them stand on their own achievements.179
176. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The “Transformative Racial Politics” of Justice
Thomas?: The Grutter v. Bollinger Opinion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 787, 787 (2005).
177. See James. M. Olson, Philip A. Vernon, Julie Aitken Harris & Kerry L.
Jang, The Heritability of Attitudes: A Study of Twins, 80 J. OF PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 845, 859 (2001) (“Attitudes are learned. But attitudes also depend on
biological factors.”).
178. Michael Winerip, President Obama, Race and the Ku Klux Klan, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/booming/presidentobama-race-and-the-ku-klux-klan.html?_r=0.
179. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part). Frederick Douglass’ speech:
“[I]n regard to the colored people, there is always more that is benevolent, I
perceive, than just, manifested toward us. What I ask for the negro is not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice. The American people
have always been anxious to know what they shall do with us . . . . I have had
but one answer from the beginning. Do nothing with us! Your doing with us
has already played the mischief with us. Do nothing with us! If the apples
will not remain on the tree of their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the
core, if they are early ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! . . . And if the negro cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also. All I ask is, give him a
chance to stand on his own legs! Let him alone! . . . ”

Id.
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Thus, experiential bias acknowledges that an individual can belong to
a particular group but still hold views that are out of sync with those of
the group. The Grutter Court’s broad definition of “diversity” that includes
identity traits that clearly are not constitutionally protected acknowledges
that a person’s identity – in a holistic sense – is based on myriad factors,
including race.180

D. Lesson Four: Grutter and Fisher Are Federalism Cases, Too
Significantly, Grutter actually is a federalism case because the Court did
not hold that states must consider race in their public university admissions.181 Consistent with federalism and the individuality of states, the Court
left it to the states to decide whether they want to consider race in their public
university admissions.182 If a state chooses to consider race, then it must
make race only one factor among many, consistent with the Individual Equality Principle.183 Ultimately, though, the choice to be or not to be an “affirmative action” state is made by the state and becomes part of its identity. Thus,
connecting equality and diversity with federalism is fairly easy.
Seeing how geographic identity is tied in to the mix is fuzzier. Clarity is
added by understanding that, although the link between geographic identity
and equality is relevant to the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not actually
derive from it. Rather, the link originates from federalism principles that are
reflected in Article III. For example, Article III links state sovereignty with a
criminal defendant’s equality by requiring that criminal trials be heard in the
state where the crime was committed.184 Jury selection in criminal trials also
links geography, federalism, and equality by limiting the selection to certain
geographic areas.185 In turn, Article III judges, through their experiential
biases, protect the Equality Principles.

E. Lesson Five: Diversity Helps to “Unlearn Prejudice”
It is an individual’s life experiences, which are shaped by race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, geography, talent, and so forth, that enrich the classroom experience for all students. In other words, the Grutter Court held that
states are allowed to value – that is, have a compelling interest in – the reality
180. See id. at 338-39.
181. See id. at 343.
182. See id.; Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623

(2014) (holding that a state constitutional amendment to ban the use of race in state
university admissions is constitutional because without a constitutional violation,
neither the U.S. Constitution nor precedent provided any basis on which a federal
court could overturn a state’s law).
183. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337-38.
184. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl 3.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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that a person’s race (and other identity traits) affects the way in which he or
she experiences the world, and that sharing those experiences in an educational setting enriches the learning environment.186 Again, I emphasize that
diversity is about equality.
Moreover, building on Gordon Allport’s pioneering work on prejudice,
studies repeatedly show that one of the best ways for anyone, particularly
children, to avoid learning prejudice toward particular groups is to interact
with those groups.187 His conclusions are worth noting:
Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and
minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly
enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by
law, custom, or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that
leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity
188
between members of the two groups.

Recent studies also indicate that even “indirect” or “imaginary” contact is
helpful to promote healthy race relations.189 For example, if one person in a
group befriends a person from an out-group, other members of the in-group
have increased positive attitudes about the out-group.190 “Whereas positive
direct intergroup contact can transform the participating individuals’ attitudes, one in-group member’s friendship with an out-group member can have
a cascading and almost viral influence as other in-group members learn of
this friendship (or experience contact indirectly).”191 Significantly, though,
this observation means that at least one person from the in-group has to have
direct contact with a member of the out-group for an “indirect” effect.192
Alternatively, for someone to imagine having a positive relationship with
someone from an out-group, the person must have positive visions, through
media or other means, of interracial relationships.193

186. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
187. See generally GORDON W. A LLPORT, THE N ATURE OF PREJUDICE (25th

anniversary ed. 1979).
188. Id. at 281.
189. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio, Anja Eller, & Miles Hewstone, Improving Intergroup Relations Through Direct, Extended and Other Forms of Indirect Contact, 14
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 147, 148 (2011).
190. Id. at 150.
191. Id. at 148; see also Thomas F. Pettigrew, Linda R. Tropp, Ulrich Wagner &
Oliver Christ, Recent Advances in Intergroup Contact Theory, 35 INT’ L. J. OF
INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS 271, 277 (2011).
192. See Dovidio, supra note 189, at 148.
193. Id. at 158.
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A primary goal of Brown v. Board of Education was to integrate the
public schools as part of the struggle to achieve racial equality.194 Allport’s
studies fully support those efforts by suggesting that:
[T]o perceive the real problems in race relations for what they are
marks a distinct gain. While they are difficult to solve, they stand a
better chance of being solved if the irrelevancies of stereotype and autistic hostility are first eliminated. And to achieve this gain the aboli195
tion of segregation helps greatly.

Racially integrated schools allow children to step up to, and even cross over,
the color line, and studies like those of Allport show that this is one of the
best ways for them to learn how to navigate it. Arms-length or abstract interracial lessons allow unconscious (or conscious) biases to fester. As Professor
Nienke Grossman said, “[t]he mere presence of excluded groups can counteract both actual bias and perceptions of bias.”196 Certainly, to the extent we
continue to allow our public schools to be largely segregated and woefully
unequal, we condone the message to our children that racial and economic
inequality are not important enough to fix. The burdens of this message fall
disproportionately on children of color. This is a resounding message about
racial inferiority and superiority, a lesson that presumably loving adults and
equality-minded people would never explicitly condone.197
Moreover, learning how to manage and develop healthy race relations is
a sign of high emotional intelligence.198 In reality, children of color have a
head start on most white children in understanding race relations because they
are forced to navigate the color line every day of their lives. Many white
children do not even have to think of race because their whiteness is like the
invisibility cloak in Harry Potter199 and hides them from the daily racial strife.
Yet every loving parent wants his or her child to have high emotional intelligence because it is key to effective leadership. Some journalists have written

194. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
195. Allport, supra note 187, at 274.
196. Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legit-

imacy of the International Court?, 12 CHI. J. I. L. 647, 665 (2012).
197. See generally Sharon E. Rush, Protecting the Dignity and Equality of
Children: The Importance of Integrated Schools, 20 TEMPLE POL. & CIVIL RTS. L.
REV. 71 (2010).
198. See generally DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT
CAN M ATTER MORE THAN IQ (10th anniversary ed. 1995); see also Sharon E. Rush,
The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 5 (1997).
199. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 201 (1999).
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about President Obama’s high emotional intelligence,200 which is not surprising precisely because he has had to mediate the color line throughout his political career. In contrast, as smart and successful as Governor Romney is,
according to political analysts his presidential campaign failed, at least in
part, because he and his advisors did not understand critical aspects of the
power dynamic between historically privileged groups and racial minorities,
immigrants, and even women.201 It is hard to unlearn prejudice or unfair bias,
especially for equality-minded people who often do not fully understand how
their thinking about other people can be unreasonable. Certainly, diverse
(integrated) classrooms offer hope that the next generation will have healthier
and more equal relationships because they will have learned what respect for
others truly means: a shared human dignity.

F. Lesson Six: The Holding in Fisher Is Irrelevant to Diversity Goals
This analysis does not change because of the Fisher Court’s decision.
The Fisher Court could have ruled for or against Fisher on the facts and kept
the basic holding of Grutter intact, or it could have held that the Constitution
prohibits states from considering race in their public university admissions
processes. An affirmation of Grutter reinforces, from the Constitution’s perspective, the reality that group racial identity – the Group Equality Principle –
is at the heart of diversity in public education. Moreover, it also reinforces
the importance of federalism and state sovereignty because each state may
choose whether or not to consider race in university admissions.202
But even if the Fisher Court had overruled Grutter and held that race
cannot be considered in public university admissions processes, it would not
mean that individual racial identity is no longer protected under the Constitution. The Individual Equality Principle would survive, in that it still would be
unconstitutional to discriminate on account of race. Indeed, Fisher’s suit was
brought under a claim of racial discrimination through the current admissions
policy, and probably would have been the Court’s rationale for overruling
Grutter if it had done so; to consider race in state university admissions even
as one factor among many would be race discrimination. No state, then,
would be able to identify as an “affirmative action” state as that phrase is
commonly understood.
But what would overruling Grutter do to the Group Equality Principle
and federalism? Importantly, even if the Fisher Court had denied states the
choice to consider race in their public school admissions processes, it is un200. See, e.g., Chris Bolis, The Emotional Intelligence of President Obama, CBS
MONEY WATCH (May 13, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301505125_162-31147537/the-emotional-intelligence-of-president-obama/.
201. See, e.g., Hope Over Experience: A Divided Country Gives Obama a Second
Chance, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052970204349404578102971575770036.
202. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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likely that diversity, including racial diversity, would have become irrelevant
to public institutions.203 It is worth emphasizing that the underlying rationale
for the Grutter Court’s decision is that a racially diverse class enriches the
learning environment, in that students can share experiences gained from
their racial identities.204 Every student in the classroom has experiential bias
based on race and myriad other factors.
Naturally, classrooms have always been filled with students who have
unique experiences to share with each other. Grutter’s focus on including the
experiences of racial minorities simply highlights the need, in a democracy
that values equality and representation, to acknowledge that the experiential
biases of these minorities are just as valuable as those of other students –
including white students – in enriching the learning environment. Grutter
exposes this history and the hidden assumption behind excluding racial minorities from certain public universities: that only white students’ experiences
have ever mattered.
Moreover, just as experiential bias has always formed the basis of
the classroom learning environment, the importance of including the experiences of racial minorities (and thus striving to meet the Group Equality Principle) will not evaporate if Grutter is overruled, as it probably will be someday. State universities understand this reality. While a future Court might
make it unconstitutional for a state to hold itself out or identify itself as an
“affirmative action” state, all states have chosen to identify as “diversity”
states. My research efforts did not find one state, through its public university or college websites, that did not value diversity. Indeed, go to any public
college or university website and inevitably it will hold itself out as an institution that seeks a diverse student body. In fact, the University of WisconsinMadison recently admitted that it altered a photo to include racial minorities
for the sole purpose of holding itself out as an institution that values racial
diversity.205 While a future Court decision might present challenges to the
way in which diversity, especially racial diversity, is achieved, achieving
diversity – or meeting the Group Equality Principle – is ostensibly a priority
for all state universities. Moreover, because the racial demographics in the
United States are becoming more and more diverse, it is unlikely that diversity will become less important.
Valuing diversity is a reasonable, sound, and realistic choice. As Professor Leong details in her recent article, however, diversity must be valued

203. See Leong, supra note 170, at 2166. (society has accepted diversity for so
long now that it is “beyond the legal realm”).
204. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
205. See Lisa Wade, Doctoring Diversity: Race and Photoshop, THE SOCIETY
PAGES (Sept. 2, 2009, 10:48 AM), http://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2009/
09/02/doctoring-diversity-race-and-photoshop/ (University of Wisconsin photoshopped picture of an African American male into football game crowd and used in
its admissions booklets).
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for the right reasons and not just for the sake of appearing non-racist.206 And,
because public institutions can choose to be diverse, their decisions support
federalism. Studies show that many, if not most, environments, particularly
those that provide services to the public, strive to be diverse. The military is
a leader in understanding the importance of diversity, and Congress recently
created “The Military Leadership Diversity Commission” to try to increase
diversity at the more senior levels.207 Businesses want diverse workforces,
and a recent McKinsey report shows why: “U.S. companies with the highest
executive-board diversity had returns on equity 95 percent higher and earnings margins 58 percent higher, on average, than those with the least executive diversity.”208 Public schools at all levels also want diverse student bodies. In fact, some schools wanted it badly enough that they used voluntary
integration plans to try to achieve it; however, the use of such plans was
struck down by the Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.209 Even “non-affirmative action” states – those
states where citizens have already exercised their sovereignty to prohibit the
use of race in admissions – want their public institutions to be diverse and go
to enormous efforts and expense to meet their goals.210 If diversity is not
206. Leong, supra note 170, at 2155.
207. Lisa Daniel, Panel Recommends Ways to Improve Military Diversity, U.S.

DEP’ T OF DEFENSE (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.
aspx?ID=63065.
208. Karen E. Klein, How ‘Diversity Fatigue’ Undermines Business Growth,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK,
SMALL
B USINESS
(May
14,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-14/how-diversity-fatigue-undermines
-business-growth.
209. 551 U.S. 701, 709 (2007).
210. The University of Florida is an excellent example. Florida operates under
“One Florida,” an executive order by Governor Jeb Bush and approved by the legislature that prohibits the use of race in public university admissions since 2000. See
Peter T. Kilborn, Jeb Bush Roils Florida on Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4,
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/04/us/jeb-bush-roils-florida-on-affirmativeaction.html. Nevertheless, diversity is extremely important to the University. It has
a Multicultural & Diversity Affairs office and a Council on Diversity. Multicultural
& Diversity Affairs, UNIV. OF FLA. DIV. OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, http://www.multicultural.ufl.edu/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); President’s Council on Diversity, UNIV.
OF FLA. HUMAN RES. SERVS., http://hr.ufl.edu/manager-resources/recruitmentstaffing/institutional-equity-diversity/presidents-council-on-diversity/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2014). Although race cannot be considered in the admissions process, successful recruitment of minorities depends, to some extent, on the University being a
diverse environment so that prospective students, staff, and faculty want to come to
the University. See Leong, supra note 170 at 2184. That is consistent with Prof.
Leong’s thin understanding of diversity. See id. at 2169-70. But the University values diversity in a much more substantive way also, and has implemented meaningful
laws, rules and regulations to create an environment that is equal for everyone. Multicultural & Diversity Affairs, UNIV. OF FLA. DIV. OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, http://www.
multicultural.ufl.edu/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). For a southern state university, this
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going to be associated with racial equality principles under the Constitution,
as a society we nevertheless seem to operate on the premise articulated by the
Grutter Court that “[e]ffective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”211 Certainly, diversity as a holistic concept, where race is only one part, seems to be here to stay. Leaders who exercise good business and democratic judgment support diversity.

G. Lesson Seven: This All Relates to the Article III Judiciary
The effective leader who supports diversity understands that diversity is
about representation and legitimacy. A business that employs no women can
say that it does not discriminate on the basis of sex, but it would be hard to
believe such a claim. Even if such a business did not discriminate, it would
appear to discriminate. And geographic identity matters in this regard, too.
Imagine how valid it would be to question the legitimacy of an international
court if all of the judges on the court were from the same country.212 Even if
the judges were impartial, they would appear unfairly biased because the
views of judges from other countries would be excluded.213 To have legitimacy as an international court, the judges must be representative of the international community and come from different countries precisely because of
their experiential diversity. Similarly, in order to have legitimacy, the experiential biases that attach to judges because of their geographic identity (and
other identity traits) must be equally represented on the Article III bench.
So it is with states and Article III courts in the United States. Professor
Sherrilyn Ifill pointed out that a circuit court of appeals would appear unfairly
biased if it was comprised of judges from only one state, because the other
states in the circuit would be unrepresented on the bench.214 This Article
extends this concept – because each state is independently sovereign and has
its own identity, the absence of a state resident as an Article III judge on the
appellate bench unconstitutionally excludes that state’s right to bring its experiential and fair state-identity bias to the decision-making process. Congress
recognized this and therefore requires by law that each state have a minimum
of one resident on each of the circuit courts of appeal.215

change in culture has been slow, but it is changing. See Leong, supra note 170,
at 2195-96.
211. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
212. See Grossman, supra note 196, at 668.
213. Id.
214. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judicial Diversity, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 45, 47 (2009).
215. 28 U.S.C. §44(c) (2012) (“In each circuit (other than the Federal judicial
circuit) there shall be at least one circuit judge in regular active service appointed
from the residents of each state in that circuit.”).
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Presidents and citizens want diverse Article III courts – diverse in a
holistic and experiential sense.216 The structure of the Article III system at
the lower court levels adds legitimacy to the Article III judiciary because
all of the states are represented in the system. Substantively, federal judges
who are citizens of the states in which they sit also bring their “local spirits”
to the federal bench; this is not a matter of unfair prejudice, but rather a matter of identity shaped by experiences and associated pride. A judge’s geographic identity adds federalism value to the bench, and because the nation is
comprised of fifty states, each of those geographic identities belongs on the
federal bench.

V. BIAS AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
The reality of the potential for unfair local bias – conscious or unconscious, and however remote – offers some support for diversity jurisdiction.
When Alexander Hamilton expressed his concern that the “local spirit(s)”
might unduly influence state judges to favor their states over the federal government,217 he might have been expressing a concern about conscious or unconscious unfair bias. In any event, the idea behind diversity jurisdiction is
that a state judge will identify with a litigant from their state such that their
shared geographic identity creates an “us versus them” dichotomy within the
lawsuit. The shared geographic identity between the judge and local resident,
so the theory goes, binds them so strongly that it is assumed the judge “will
find a way,” perhaps unwittingly, to rule in favor of the resident. The Article
III provision for diversity jurisdiction in federal court provides an out-of-state
litigant with a way to avoid this risk. Thus, Congress’ unwillingness to abolish diversity jurisdiction is defensible if the potential for unfair bias exists.
An Article III judge would be impartial – at least theoretically.
Significantly, Article III judges, with a few exceptions, are required by
Congress to be residents of the states wherein they preside;218 thus, they also
216. See generally Ifill, supra note 214 (stating that diversity in a holistic sense,
including racial, gender and geographic, enhances the legitimacy of the Court).
217. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 544 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., 1898); see Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 113 n.54.
218. For court of appeals judges, see 28 U.S.C. §44(c) (2012) (“Except in
the
District of Columbia, each circuit judge shall be a resident of the circuit for which
appointed at the time of his appointment and thereafter while in active service.”).
For district court judges, see 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) (2012) (“Each district judge, except
in the District of Columbia, the Southern District of New York, and the Eastern
District of New York, shall reside in the district or one of the districts for which he
is appointed. Each district judge of the Southern District of New York and the Eastern District of New York may reside within 20 miles of the district to which he or
she is appointed.”).
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share a geographic identity with the plaintiff and presumably have the potential to be just as unfairly biased as state judges.219 Theoretically, the shield
that guards against unfair bias stemming from shared geographic identities is
the fact that the Article III judge is not elected and also enjoys life tenure and
salary protection. Admittedly, an Article III judge has no motivation to rule
for the local resident in order to curry favorable support in the next election.
But neither did most state judges at the time because they enjoyed similar
metrics of judicial independence.220

B. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Ironically, some of the best evidence of the importance of states’ voices
in the national government comes from highlighting a few points about concurrent federal question (general arising under) jurisdiction. Initially, Congress did not extend federal question jurisdiction to federal courts because of
both a fear of putting too much power in the national government, and for
reasons of expense.221 Interestingly, though, there seemed to be an understanding that state court judges were capable of deciding federal question
cases.222 The best evidence of this lies in the Madisonian Compromise between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists – an agreement, reflected in
Article III, to establish one Supreme Court and otherwise give Congress discretion to create lower federal courts.223 Obviously, in the absence of lower
federal courts, the presumption was that federal question cases would be
heard in state courts.224 Alexander Hamilton also espoused his view that
states should enjoy concurrent federal question jurisdiction.225
For about one year, from 1801 to 1802, Congress did grant federal
courts jurisdiction over federal question cases;226 it was not until 1875 that
Congress made federal question jurisdiction concurrent.227 Congress also was
motivated to give federal courts federal question jurisdiction at the time because it believed that states would be biased against federal claims.228 But
Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1847-48.
See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 87, at 890.
See id.
Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1825.
Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the
Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U.
PA. L. REV. 45, 47, 55 (1975).
225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton).
226. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92 (creating arising under
jurisdiction), repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.
227. 28 USC § 1331 (2012); Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740,
745 (2012) (noting that federal courts have possessed federal question jurisdiction
since 1875).
228. Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 102-06.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
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Congress’ timing, of course, was not a coincidence. The Civil War had just
ended, the Reconstruction Amendments were added to the Constitution, and
there was concern regarding whether the newly-freed slaves would receive
justice in some states’ courts as they exercised their new constitutional
rights.229 After all, the geography of slavery had significantly impacted not
just states’ identities, but individuals’ identities as well. Enslaved blacks,
legally classified as property, were confined to certain spaces and largely kept
out of the public spaces that were reserved for whites. When a slave was able
to cross geographic boundaries into a “free” state or territory, the Supreme
Court upheld the master’s right to return the slave to the master’s home.230
While the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, change inevitably took
time. Remarkably, progress toward full racial equality was significantly hindered following the Civil War. Under the disingenuous rubric of “separate
but equal,” state Jim Crow laws continued to maintain the geographic spaces
that defined race relations – the color line – by mandating the public segregation of people based on race.231 The privilege of simply being in public spaces seemed indelibly etched into whiteness.232
Interestingly, by 1875, most state judges had lost the metrics of judicial
independence they shared with Article III judges and became elected or appointed.233 In light of the Jim Crow laws in many states, and given the need
229. See Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30, at 1827.
230. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 540-41 (1842).
231. See Sharon E. Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn’t Enough, 32

CONN. L. REV. 1, 21 (1999).
232. For some people, that impression lingers. For example, the controversy
surrounding what happened to Trayvon Martin and the question about whether he
“belonged” in the neighborhood that night – racial territoriality – exemplifies how the
color-line continues to divide people. See Dan Barry et al., Race, Tragedy and Outrage Collide After a Shot in Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-prompts-a-reviewof-ideals.html?. How confusing is race and how confused are we as a society, generally, about race? Consider that the attorneys in the case reassured the jury that the
case was not about race. See, e.g., Lisa Lucas & Corky Siemaszko, Trayvon Martin
Trial: After Prosecution Witness Grilled over ‘Cracker’ Comment, Martin Family
Lawyer Says Trial Not About Race, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 28, 2013, 5:02 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/trayvon-martin-trial-prosecution-starwitness-grilled-article-1.1384074. But all of the media attention about the case focused on virtually nothing but race, and, ironically, on the question whether or not it
really was about race. A Pew Research Study found that eighty-six percent of blacks,
but only thirty percent of whites, were dissatisfied with the Zimmerman verdict. See
Big Racial Divide over Zimmerman Verdict: Whites Say Too Much Focus on Race,
Blacks Disagree, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (July 22, 2013),
http://www.people-press.org/2013/07/22/big-racial-divide-over-zimmerman-verdict/.
The study also found that seventy-eight percent of blacks and twenty-eight percent of
whites believed the case raised important issues about race. Id.
233. Fitzpatrick, supra note 87, at 842.
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of state judges to be re-elected or re-appointed, the continuing impartiality of
Article III judges meant that they could be trusted, at least compared to state
judges, with protecting the newly-freed slaves’ individual rights. Federal
question jurisdiction provided them a pathway to federal court.
From the federalism perspective, the significance of Congress making
general federal question jurisdiction concurrent with state jurisdiction –
and not exclusively federal – cannot be overstated. Consistent with this Article’s theme, although saved for another day, states arguably have a right to
hear federal question cases and Congress would not have the authority to
make it exclusively federal.234 In reality, though, this is unlikely to be an
issue because engaging in constitutional interpretation is one of the most
powerful ways for a state to participate in the national government. No state
has declined to participate in this enterprise by refusing to exercise federal
question jurisdiction.
This is different from saying that Congress has the constitutional power
to make states hear federal question cases. Consistent with federalism and
the Court’s recent reliance on the anti-commandeering principle,235 it is reasonable to question whether Congress has the constitutional authority to make
states hear all federal question cases. In its 1947 decision Testa v. Katt, the
Court held that states must hear federal claims when states provide for review
of similar types of cases under their own laws.236 But, again, the question is
largely theoretical with respect to federal question cases that raise constitutional issues.237 By making general federal question jurisdiction concurrent
234. Alexander Hamilton opined that federal and state courts would enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims absent special circumstances that would warrant
making jurisdiction exclusively federal. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander
Hamilton); see also Purcell, supra note 38, at 692 n.43.
235. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902, 935 (1997) (holding that
Congress lacks authority to make states participate in administering background
checks on gun purchases under federal regulatory law); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding that Congress lacks authority to make states “take
title” to radioactive waste under federal regulatory scheme).
236. 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947). Testa is often cited as the case that establishes the
principle that states have a duty to hear federal cases. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at
928; Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94
GEO. L.J. 949, 950 (2006). But in Testa, the underlying issue involved a federal
statute, the Emergency Price Control Act, and Rhode Island provided for state court
review of similar issues. Testa, 330 U.S. at 387-88. It also has surfaced in section
1983 cases, and in cases under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act. See Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1990); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and
State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949 (2006). Moreover, the recent decisions in
Printz and New York cause some scholars to question whether the federal government
can make states hear federal cases. See Bellia, supra; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 216-218 (5th ed. 2007).
237. The difference between statutory and constitutional cases is significant.
Presumably, states want to participate in constitutional interpretation, but they might
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with states, Congress reinforced the importance of states in our system of
government. What better way to demonstrate the importance and uniqueness
of each state than to continue to have them share responsibility with Article
III courts for interpreting federal law, including the Constitution, even though
the basic premise underlying the enactment of federal question jurisdiction
was to avoid unfair state court bias against federal claims.238 Certainly, when
Congress provided for general arising under jurisdiction and did not cut out
state courts (even if it was a matter of efficiency and a practical need to have
state courts hear federal claims), it allowed state court judges – even ones
thought to be unfairly biased by the “local spirit” – to participate in deciding
the meaning of federal law, including the Constitution. Naturally, state courts
adjudicating federal claims were, and still are, bound by the Constitution to
respect the supremacy of federal law. Any mistakes made by lower court
judges, state or federal, are amenable to correction by the Supreme Court.
Moreover, from the beginning, the judicial system relied on state
courts to hear federal claims knowing that state court judges would reach
different conclusions in their interpretations of federal law. In fact, providing
for “uniformity” in federal law is often cited as a core reason for extending
federal question jurisdiction to federal courts.239 Time has shown that
the goal of achieving uniformity, however, has been elusive.240 Even if
concurrent arising under jurisdiction is not constitutionally compelled, as I
believe it is, a divergence among judges – state and federal – as to the meaning of federal law has always existed and has come to be an acceptable part of
our democracy. Stated alternatively, the diversity among the different state
judges’ voices is an integral part of federalism because each state is an independent sovereign.
The Supreme Court naturally has the authority to review state court decisions to clarify the meaning of federal law and to ensure its supremacy, but
that authority is largely discretionary under the Court’s certiorari process.
The Court, particularly under the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and continuing
through Chief Justice Roberts, has been extremely interested in granting certiorari in cases that raise a wide spectrum of federalism issues.241 While
states do not win all the time,242 the Court has protected state sovereignty
have less incentive to participate in the interpretation of federal statutes, unless the
statue has a direct effect on the state. For example, a state presumably would be interested in interpreting immigration federal statutes, but might have less interest in
hearing individual employment discrimination cases under Title VII under FELA.
See Bellia, supra note 236.
238. See supra Part II.B.
239. Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 97.
240. Id.
241. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, What Federalism & Why? Science Versus Doctrine,
35 PEPP. L. REV. 47, 52, 57 (2007).
242. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2534 (2012) (holding
that Congress’ power to regulate immigration preempted conflicting state laws); Nat’l
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under various parts of the Constitution, including the Commerce Clause243
and the Tenth,244 Eleventh245 and Fourteenth Amendments.246 It also has
interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, otherwise known as the Civil Rights Act of
1871, in ways that make it increasingly difficult for individuals to seek redress for violations of their individual liberties by states.247
In the larger scheme, though, the Court reviews less than ten percent of
the cases that seek review.248 Consequently, many state court decisions are
the final word in a particular case. When the Supreme Court does review a
state court’s decision, it benefits from the legal reasoning of different state,
and perhaps federal, judges who decided similar cases. A primary reason for
granting certiorari in a given case might be because there are conflicting decisions among lower courts – state or federal. In the final analysis, it might be
a state court’s reasoning that is affirmed by the Supreme Court.249

Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (holding that Congress
lacks Commerce Clause power to make states participate in Medicaid expansion or
lose all of their federal funding for Medicaid); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9
(2005) (holding that Congress has the Commerce Clause power to criminalize the
possession of medical marijuana even though California did not make it a state
crime); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that a state law criminalizing homosexual sodomy is an unconstitutional violation of privacy under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that
Colorado’s amendment to its state constitution prohibiting gays from seeking equal
protection of the laws is unconstitutional).
243. Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that Congress
lacks Commerce Clause power to criminalize the possession of a gun within 1000 feet
of a school).
244. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks power to abrogate state’s sovereign immunity in state court); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress lacks Commerce Clause power to commandeer states into federal regulatory program).
245. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding that Congress lacks Commerce Clause power to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity protected under the Eleventh Amendment). But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment is limited by Congress’ enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
246. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that Congress’
Section Five power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize it to
create new rights).
247. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65 (1989)
(noting that the state is not a person subject to suit under section 1983 because Congress did not express a clear intent to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity).
248. See infra Part VII.
249. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989) (affirming
state court decision upholding state law that created presumption of paternity in marital husband over biological father).
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C. Geographic Identity of States
The significant point, though, is that whether or not a judge enjoys judicial independence, he or she nevertheless has a geographic identity. That
identity, grounded in federalism principles protected by the Constitution, can
be enormously important in defining the relationship between federalism and
Article III. Professor Purcell describes this influence:
Indeed, the fact that no federal judicial district crossed state lines gave
the national courts an abiding state-specific identity, while the selection of area residents for federal judgeships and the influence of both
local politics and senatorial courtesy on the appointment process reinforced the weight of local concerns among federal judges. Local and
regional values shaped the character of those appointed, and they
shaped as well the character of the local bars and professional elites
250
with whom those judges lived and worked.

Thus, the histories and traditions that shape a state’s identity belong just
as much to an Article III judge sitting in a particular state as they do to a state
judge. Alexander Hamilton, expressing his fear that state judges might be
biased against federal claims in state court, opined that “the prevalency of a
local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction
of national causes”251 An Article III judge, like a state judge, “belongs to”
the geographic state (or circuit) in which he or she sits. Article III judges can
claim their geographic areas (states or circuits) as their judicial territory and,
correspondingly, citizens living in the geographic areas where the Article III
judges sit can claim those judges as “their” judges. Regardless of an individual Article III judge’s personality, the judge represents his or her state and, in
essence, takes on the state’s identity as its Article III representative. The
experiences a judge has by virtue of belonging to a particular state shape the
judge’s views and even their reality of the world. In this way, Article III
judges are representatives of the concept of state sovereignty.
Even under the assumption that most judges avoid unfair conscious bias,
a judge’s geographic identity nevertheless remains relevant because he or she
will be experientially biased as a result of his or her geographic identity.
Experiential bias is an inherent human trait and should not be conflated with
unfair bias. Just as experiences based on race or sex influence each person,
the experiences a judge has because he or she is a citizen of a particular state
inevitably influence his or her decision making.
To summarize thus far, experiential bias suggests that people, including
judges, make decisions that are not neutral, but which still can be fair and
250. Purcell, supra note 38, at 716-17.
251. Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 113 n.54 (emphasis added) (the quote continues,

“and, not being employees of the federal government, might be more inclined to protect state interests over federal ones”).
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based on the rule of law. The more important point is that experiential bias is
omnipresent; it cannot be avoided. However, it also is not automatically unfair. Focusing on judicial bias, one must consider that a judge can be consciously or unconsciously biased, in a fair or unfair way. Here, I am not talking about judges who should recuse themselves because of a conflict of interest, or about the openly prejudiced judges who also should not be deciding
cases that arouse their prejudices (if they should be judges at all). Rather, I
am focusing on the reasonable judge. When a reasonable judge strays from
reason and consciously rules in favor of one party without regard to legitimate procedural rules or the merits of the case, the judge is knowingly biased
in an unfair way. For example, a judge who always rules in favor of a party
just because the judge and the litigant have the same birthday is unfairly biased. The next Part draws on identity scholarship to expose how the fear of
unfair bias associated with geography is very similar to the fear of unfair bias
associated with other identity traits, such as race.

VI. JUDGES AND IDENTITY: FROM FEDERAL JURISDICTION TO
EQUALITY
Ironically, accusations of unfair judicial bias stemming from a judge’s
identity usually are not made until there is a shared identity connection between the judge and one of the litigants.252 This is at the heart of the reason
for diversity jurisdiction. Because the state judge and the local resident have
a shared geographic identity – for example, State X – the judge is presumed
to be biased in favor of Party X and against the other party from State Y. The
resulting teams consist of “us,” Judge X and local resident from State X, and
“them,” people from State Y.
This situation also arises when a judge and a litigant share other common identity traits. Significantly, though, it usually only arises when the
judge is a member of a historically underrepresented group and shares an
identity trait with one of the litigants. Consider a case in which a woman
accuses a man of sexual harassment. The issue of unfair bias usually only
arises if the case comes before a female judge. Typically, the presumption is
the female judge is unfairly biased in favor of the female plaintiff and against
the male defendant. The resulting teams consist of “us,” the female judge and
female litigant, and “them,” men (particularly the male defendant).
Identity scholarship exposes the hidden assumptions behind this concern
because, of course, it is logical to assume that if a female judge were unfairly
biased in favor of a female plaintiff, then a male judge would be unfairly
biased in favor of a male defendant. The latter possibility, of course, usually
is not a concern because male judges are thought to be objective and neu252. See, e.g., Michael A. Lindenberger, Should the Prop 8 Decision Be Overturned Because the Judge is Gay?, TIME, Apr. 26, 2011, http://content.time.
com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2067679,00.html.
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tral.253 In the specific context of a sexual harassment suit, the source of the
male judge’s neutrality is that he is not a woman and therefore can remain
objective. The parallels between the male judge’s perceived objectivity in the
sexual harassment suit and that of an Article III judge in a diversity suit are
readily apparent.
This focus, like the focus on bias in diversity jurisdiction, in many ways
misses the moral crux of the matter.254 Just as the Article III judge has a geographic identity, the male judge in the sexual harassment hypothetical, while
not a woman, nevertheless has a sex and gender identity. The female or the
male judge might be unfairly biased, even unconsciously so. In reality,
though, they both will be experientially biased, because sex and gender have
a profound effect on how women and men experience life. Some might even
argue that a woman would be a fairer judge in a sexual harassment case because her experiences as a woman would enable her to better understand the
power dynamics that lie at the heart of sexual harassment. Justice Sotomayor
opined about the role of life experiences in judging before she was appointed
to the Court: “I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her
experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white
male who hasn’t lived that life.”255 Reactions to Justice Sotomayor’s comments, including her own explanation during her confirmation hearings in
which she said that “she made a bad play on words,”256 highlight how complicated identity “politics” can be.
The sexual harassment hypothetical and Justice Sotomayor’s comment
are consistent with the Group Equality Principle, which is premised on the
idea that belonging to a historically-discriminated group influences how one
perceives the world. Regardless of where one might come out on that point,
certainly, there is no basis to support an accusation that a female judge in a
sexual harassment case would be unfairly experientially biased and that a
male judge would be fairly experientially biased (which historically means
not biased at all). Today, through education and a growing awareness of stereotypes, many people might presume that both the male and female judge

253. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. R EV. 829,
832 (1990) (“[T]he theory of positionality offers the best explanatory grounding for
feminist knowledge. Positionality rejects both the objectivism of whole, fixed, impartial truth and the relativism of different-but-equal truths. It posits instead that being
‘correct’ in law is a function of being situated in particular, partial perspectives upon
which the individual is obligated to attempt to improve.”).
254. See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
YALE L.J. 1371, 1387 (1986).
255. Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. TIMES ,
May 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/15judge.html?_r=0.
256. High Marks for Sotomayor After Tough Questioning, CNNPOLITICS.COM
(July 14, 2009, 8:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/14/sotomayor.hearing/.
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will adjudicate the case fairly even though their gender differences shape how
each of them views or understands the dynamics of sexual harassment.
But the progress we have made in sex and gender equality is less evident
in other areas wherein presumptions of unfair bias persist. In fact, this was
the focus of yet another case before the Court this term, Hollingsworth v.
Perry.257 In Perry, Judge Vaughn Walker of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California was accused of being unfairly biased when he
ruled that California’s Proposition 8 (banning same-sex marriage) is unconstitutional.258 His sexual orientation was never a public issue during the trial
because he did not tell the public that he is gay.259 Once he announced that,
however, some people called for his ruling to be voided, accusing him of
unfair bias and claiming that he ruled the way he did so he could marry his
long-term partner.260
Several hidden assumptions lurk behind this curtain. Most obvious is
the assumption that Judge Walker could not be fair or impartial because of his
sexual orientation and, correlatively, that a heterosexual judge would automatically have been fair and impartial because of his or her sexual orientation. This accusation that a judge will be unfair because he or she could issue
a ruling that positively affects the judge seems to align with the position that
the judge should recuse himself or herself because he or she has a conflict of
interest in deciding the case. But this is a red herring, which becomes obvious when viewed from a different perspective.
More realistically, the accusation that Judge Walker was unfairly biased
likely stems from a prejudice against homosexuals, based on conscious and
unconscious homophobia by different members of the protestors. This can be
deduced by exposing a perhaps less obvious assumption that appears neutral
to many equality-minded people: that a heterosexual judge would have ruled
the other way and upheld the ban on gay marriage. We know these assumptions operated in this case because otherwise there would not have been such
public outrage. If those people who were upset with Judge Walker’s ruling
had thought it was “fair,” they would have had no basis for trying to invalidate it. By calling for a heterosexual judge to decide the case, those people
who were upset clearly wanted a different outcome, which from their view
would have been fair.
What many equality-minded people miss in a situation like this is obviated upon learning some of the lessons offered by identity scholarship. Just
as any judge deciding a race discrimination case has a racial identity, or as
any judge deciding a sex discrimination case has a gender identity, any judge
deciding a sexual orientation discrimination case will have a sexual orienta-

257.
258.
259.
260.

133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
See Lindenberger, supra note 252.
Id.
Id.
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tion identity. And, in fact, an individual’s identity will be a mixture of certain
traits – a black female judge or a white heterosexual judge, for example.261
Identity has always mattered because of the experiential biases that attach to identity. Generally, though, the identities of historically privileged
groups set a baseline for what is considered “neutral” or “objective” and this
enabled those identities to become invisible even as they empowered those
people who shared them. Identity scholarship is premised on exposing how
the law functions to protect historically privileged groups based on their race
(Caucasian), sex (male), sexual orientation (heterosexual), religion, (Christian), and so forth.262
Social science also supports the critical observations of identity scholars.
Returning to the context of race and employment discrimination, empirical
studies show that the race of the judge and the plaintiff is statistically relevant
in predicting whether a case survives summary judgment.263 For example,
“[w]hite judges are far more likely to dispose of any employment discrimination case at the summary judgment phase than are minority judges.”264
Moreover, “white judges tend to dismiss cases involving minority plaintiffs at
a much higher rate than cases involving white plaintiffs.”265 Interestingly,
minority judges dismissed cases of minority plaintiffs at a higher rate than
they dismissed cases of white plaintiffs.266 Professors Jill Weinberg and
Laura Nielsen suggest that these outcomes are consistent with other research
that shows that people “are more or less likely to perceive the presence of
discrimination based on their identification with a stigmatized social
group.”267 Again, this is consistent with valuing the Group Equality Principle
and with the concept of “critical mass.”
All judges bring to the bench their experiential biases, but this is far
from saying that judges are unfairly biased because of who they are. But who
they are still matters because experiential bias influences decision making.
Social science studies indicate that people can be taught to be more empathic
toward people who have different identity traits.268 As expressed above,
learning to be empathic toward others is facilitated by being actively engaged
with them, for example, in a school setting. High empathy skills are yet another sign of high emotional intelligence.269 Today, equality-minded people
261. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
262. See, e.g., id. at 140; James, supra note 170.
263. Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 347 (2012).
264. Id. at 346.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 326.
268. Id. at 349-50.
269. Goleman, supra note 198, at 105.
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are working diligently to undo the harm caused by laws that promote inequality. They are learning about the unfairness of stereotypes and trying to avoid
basing decisions on them.
This Article merely highlights that geographic identity is yet another
factor that influences decision making, sometimes in strangely obvious or
not-so-obvious ways. “For reasons that remain unclear, for example, during
the period from 1973 to 1990 federal courts in the West were less receptive to
abortion rights than were federal courts in other regions of the country.”270 It
may not come as a surprise to learn that the five states with the highest average ages of marriage are in the Northeast, or that “[t]he states with the lowest
average ages of marriage . . . are in the South, the mountain west, or the border between the North-South border . . .”271 Generally, and consistent with
federalism, family law cases belong in state courts;272 but many family issues
relate to questions that, for some state citizens, involve morality and implicate
constitutional questions about equality and due process. The marriage laws in
states reflect the states’ norms and are consistent with their political identities
as either “liberal” or “conservative.” It is important to remember, however,
that these labels are generalities and states should not be stereotyped or pigeon-holed into reified historical identities that they are not allowed to overcome. This is exactly what Shelby County273 was about – had Shelby County
corrected its prior identity as a county that discriminates on the basis of race
in elections, and if so, did Congress continue to have the power to enforce the
Voting Rights Act in that county?
Experiential bias based on geographic identity is a unique kind of bias
that may or may not have anything to do with unfair bias against people based
on their race, ethnicity, gender, or other identity traits. For example, an Alaskan Article III judge presumably will not let his or her state identity unfairly
affect a case, but the Alaskan judge will nevertheless always be a representative of Alaska and have “experiential” bias. If a case were to arise involving
an issue especially important to Alaska – for example, drilling for oil off the
coast – we presume the Article III judge could and would avoid being unfairly affected by his or her biases stemming from the geographic connection
between the judge and one of the litigants. With respect to conscious geographic bias, we believe he or she would be able to avoid that, but we also
know unconscious bias is real. Modern social science studies show that an
individual with a strong “environmental identity” has “less difficulty and
greater confidence” in making decisions that have an impact on the environ270. Purcell, supra note 38, at 719.
271. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Judging Families, 77 U.M.K.C. L. R EV. 267,

289-90 (2008). The five Northeastern states are Massachusetts, New York, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey. Id. at 289. The states with the lowest average
ages are Utah, Oklahoma, Idaho, Arkansas, and Kentucky. Id. at 290.
272. See generally Sharon E. Rush, Domestic Relations Law: Federal Jurisdiction
and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1984).
273. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618-19 (2013).

File: Rush – Final Edits

2014]

Created on: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM

Last Printed: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM

FEDERALISM, DIVERSITY, EQUALITY, AND JUDGES

169

ment.274 Consistent with this modern research, one could reasonably expect
that the Alaskan judge, because of his or her Alaskan “experiential” identity,
would view and understand the dynamics of the drilling case in a way that a
non-Alaskan judge might not. The two judges might even reach different
conclusions. Significantly, different conclusions would not necessarily be the
result of unfair bias. Rather, they might be the result of different interpretations and understandings of the case – in other words, the result of the judges
being two different people with two different life experiences.275 Justice Byron White appreciated having Justice Thurgood Marshall on the Court, because Justice Marshall “ . . . would tell us things that we knew but would
rather forget; and he told us much that we did not know due to the limitations
of our own experience.”276 That is why the Article III judiciary must be geographically diverse. Each state, as a matter of sovereignty, has a right under
federalism principles to have its voice heard from the Article III bench.
In light of the theory behind diversity jurisdiction – to avoid a judge’s
state identity from unfairly influencing his or her judgment – it seems counterintuitive to suggest that a state has a “right” to be represented on the Article III bench. But it is worth highlighting that federalism requires a geographically diverse judiciary. We presume judges know when to recuse
themselves because of their own limited abilities to be fair, but we also know
that unconscious bias influences judges’ decisions. Chief Justice Roberts
recently articulated that public officials can most easily avoid race discrimination by adopting a colorblind philosophy,277 a view many people eschew.
Unlike the debate over colorblindness, not only does the Constitution not
require that we be blind to geographic diversity, but the very foundation of
federalism is premised on acknowledging and valuing that diversity. Federalism protects the equality of states with respect to their “rights” to be treated as
equal by the national government. Not only does geographic identity help
shape one’s views, like other identity traits do, but it is precisely because we

274. Patrick Devine-Wright & Susan Clayton, Introduction to the Special Issue:
Place, Identity and Environmental Behavior, 30 J. OF ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 267,
268 (2010).
275. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998); see also Purcell, Class Action, supra note 30,
at 1849-50.
276. Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. R EV.
1215, 1216 (1992).
277. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007) (Roberts, J., plurality opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). The idea that the “[C]onstitution
is colorblind” ironically comes from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, in
which the Court upheld the “separate but equal” doctrine. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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do not know if a particular bias is unfair that any chances that it might be
must be born equally among a holistically diverse federal judiciary.

VII. THE SUPREME COURT
As the institution in the United States that tells us “what the law is,”278 it
is especially important for the Supreme Court, as an anti-majoritarian institution, to be representative of the people. Naturally, reasonable people disagree
on what it means for the Justices to be representative of the people. For example, although the Constitution does not require the Justices to have any
particular qualifications, all 112 Justices have been lawyers; however, some
people might argue that lawyers are not representative of the people. Moreover, even if one thinks that being a lawyer is a reasonable qualification to
expect of Justices, who, as Hamilton put it, are the “guardians of the Constitution,”279 one might nevertheless be concerned about the growing tendency for
the Justices to receive their legal education at a few elite law schools – all of
which happen to be in the Northeast.280 These types of concerns raise diversity issues, which in turn raise issues about equality and representation.281
Geographic diversity, in contrast, raises questions about federalism and
representation. Accordingly, it is logical to consider the role federalism and
states should play in making the Court representative of the people. As explored below, it is clear that geography played a much more significant role at
the beginning of the nation’s history. Some scholars have called for a modification of the current Court’s operations, primarily for efficiency reasons,
including the possibility of increasing the number of Justices.282 Consistent
with those proposals and this Article, a geographically representative Court
could have a Justice from each of the regional circuits. At a minimum, this
278. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
279. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
280. Barton, supra note 39, at 1168-70. Currently, all of the Justices attended
either Harvard or Yale. Id. at 1139. Justice Ginsburg attended Harvard but received
her law degree from Columbia Law School, which is also an Ivy League school. See
id. at 1187; Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, U.S. SUPREME
COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Mar. 21,
2014). Notably, this cluster of law schools is geographically isolated in the Northeast.
See Barton, supra note 39, at 1164.
281. For example, six current Justices, Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, Thomas,
and Sotomayor, are Catholic. Michael Paulson, Sotomayor Would Be Sixth Catholic
Justice, BOSTON GLOBE (May 26, 2009, 2:33 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/
local/articles_of_faith/2009/05/sotomayor_would.html.
282. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the
Supreme Court, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 645, 647 (2009); Jonathan Turley, A Bigger, Better
Supreme Court: The Case for Reform, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2012, 1:24 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/27/bigger-bet-ter-supremecourt-reform.
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Article suggests that those involved in the confirmation process should be
more sensitive to, and appreciative of, the relationship among federalism,
diversity, and equality to achieve greater geographic diversity on the Court.283

A. Geographic Diversity and Federalism
1. Early History
Historically, there are at least four indications of the importance of geography in establishing a strong relationship between the Supreme Court and
the states. First, Article III provides that there is only one Supreme Court,
which interestingly did not have a permanent home until 1935.284 Prior to
that, and while Washington, D.C. was under construction, the then six Justices of the Court met in New York City and then in Philadelphia.285 In 1800,
Washington, D.C. became the seat of the national government, but the Court
did not have its own building until Chief Justice William Howard Taft persuaded Congress that the Court deserved and needed a permanent residence.286 Finally, construction on the Supreme Court building was completed
in 1935.287 It is logical and consistent with treating the states equally that the
Court is not situated in any one state.
Second, the Framers also gave careful consideration to establishing an
equal relationship among the states with the Court. Highlighting an earlier
observation, to minimize the possibility that judicial nominees would come
disproportionately from the larger states, thus excluding the voices of smaller
states, the Framers provided in Article III for Senate confirmation of all Article III judges, including Justices of the Supreme Court.288 Moreover, senators
are heavily involved in the nomination process for lower federal court judges.289 Through judicial selection commissions, senators can nominate candidates – perhaps the most direct way for states’ voices to be heard. Their participation certainly adds geographic diversity to the process.290 Critically,
heavy involvement of senators in the nomination process for lower federal

283. See infra Part VII.B.
284. The Court Building, U.S. SUPREME COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/

about/courtbuilding.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1496 (1992).
289. Clark, supra note 58, at 465-67; see also DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. (CRS), SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS: ROLES OF THE
PRESIDENT, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND SENATE 2-3 (July 6, 2005), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/50146.pdf.
290. Clark, supra note 58, at 465.
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judges increasingly affects who ultimately sits on the Court because nominees
increasingly have court of appeals experience.
A third and extremely significant indication of the importance of
geography in the relationship between the Court and the states lies in the way
Congress structured the Article III judiciary and established the policy
of “circuit riding.”291 Specifically, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
created circuit courts and, rather than staffing them with circuit judges,
provided for the Supreme Court Justices to “ride circuit.”292 Two Justices
would be assigned to a circuit where they lived293 and, together with the
district court judge in the region, would hold court.294 Circuit riding served
several purposes, including “[keeping] the Federal Judiciary in touch with the
local communities.”295
The value of having the Justices ride circuit, ironically, was to facilitate
the development of a uniform body of federal law and give “the people of
every state a sense of national judicial power through the presence of the Supreme Court Justices.”296 From this view, it seems that the relationship between the local and national judiciaries primarily served the Federalists’
goals. Through circuit riding, the people could see the value of having a
strong centralized government by watching the Supreme Court Justices in
action in their own geographic areas.
From the states’ views, though, it was important for the circuit Justices
to be familiar with their circuit’s state laws, because most of the circuit
courts’ dockets involved diversity cases. The late Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that all of the Justices, because they rode circuit, had to have
knowledge of the law in their circuits.297 It is important to keep in mind, of
course, that state law controlled issues in diversity cases and judges did not
draw on general federal common law unless they were filling in voids they
believed were left by a state’s laws. From the states’ views, then, riding circuit allowed the Justices to protect state sovereignty.

291. Thomas E. Baker, PRIMER ON THE J URISDICTION OF THE U.S. C OURTS OF
APPEAL 5 (2d ed. 2009).
292. Id.
293. See Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1761 (2003). The Act of 1789 did
not require that the Justice be a resident of his circuit; the Court adopted this rule. See
id. at 1757.
294. Id. Congress was concerned, for example, about the costs associated with
creating circuit court judges. Id. at 1757-58.
295. Id. at 1759 (quoting C HARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME C OURT IN U NITED
STATES H ISTORY 58 (1926)).
296. Id. (quoting MARTIN H. R EDISH ET AL., MOORE’ S FEDERAL PRACTICE 100
app., at 12 (3d ed. 1997)).
297. Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986).
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Circuit riding immediately became unpopular with the Justices because
the burden of traveling literally exhausted them even though they lived within
their circuits. Pleas to Congress to abolish the practice fell on deaf ears for
over 100 years.298 As the country expanded, Congress provided for more
circuits. Beginning with the creation of the Seventh Circuit in 1807, Congress increased the number of Justices on the Court to seven.299 The newly
added Justices were then responsible for riding circuit in the newlyestablished circuits.300 This explains why the Court had ten justices in 1863;
that was the year Congress established the Tenth Circuit.301 Notably, this
period marked the peak of geographic diversity and the concomitant representation of the states on the Supreme Court.
A fourth indication of the importance of geographic diversity on the
Court came from the leadership of President Washington. He set an early
tone for ensuring that the Court be geographically diverse, something he
strongly believed in.302 President Washington’s belief in the importance of
the geographic relationship between the states and the Article III judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court, was shared by his Vice President, John Adams who stated that,
It would have an [sic] happy effect if all the judges of the national supreme Court, could be taken from the chief Justices of the several
states. The superiority of the national government would in this way
be decidedly acknowledged. All the judges of the states would look
up to the national bench as their ultimate object. As there is great
danger of collisions between the national and state judiciaries, if the
state judges are men possessed of larger portions of the people’s con303
fidence than the national judges, the latter will become unpopular.

Realistically, of course, President Washington’s pool of nominees was
limited because of circuit riding and the need for Justices to live in their
298. See Glick, supra note 293, at 1755.
299. Establishment of the Seventh Circuit: “An Act Establishing Circuit Courts,

and Abridging the Jurisdiction of the District Courts in the Districts of Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Ohio”, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.
nsf/page/landmark_05.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
300. Id.
301. Establishment of the Tenth Circuit: “An Act to Provide Circuit Courts for
the Districts of California and Oregon, and for Other Purposes”, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_08.html (last visited Mar.
21, 2014).
302. Maeva Marcus, Federal Judicial Selection: The First Decade, 39 U. R ICH.
L. REV. 797, 800 (2005).
303. Id. at 801 (quoting from a letter from John Adams to Stephen Higginson
(Sept. 21, 1789), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE U NITED S TATES , 1789-1800, at 663 (MAEVA MARCUS & J AMES R. P ERRY
EDS., 1985)).
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circuits. But President Washington’s commitment to geographic diversity
was much deeper. He wanted to avoid creating “jealousy” among the
states by appointing more than one nominee from a state to the Supreme
Court.304 He stated, “It would be inexpedient to take two of the Associate
Judges from the same state. The practice has been to . . . disseminate them
through the United States.”305
Following President Washington’s lead, subsequent presidents also
heeded the need for geographic diversity on the Court. For example, when
Justice William Cushing of Massachusetts died, President Madison kept nominating candidates from Massachusetts, finally settling on Justice Story in
1811.306 Beginning with President Lincoln’s term, however, concerns about
geographic diversity took on two added dimensions – issues related to the
Civil War and Congress’ creation of the courts of appeals.
The seat first occupied by John Rutledge of South Carolina in 1789 became known as the “southern” seat.307 However, that changed after the Civil
War because Republicans, who were a majority in Congress, were concerned
that the slave states had too strong a voice on the Court.308 At the time, recall
that each circuit had a representative on the Court, and as a result, five of the
nine circuits that existed before 1863 included only slave states.309 In 1866,
to reduce the influence of southern states on the Court, Congress reduced the
number of Justices to seven and the number of circuits from ten to nine, including only two (the Fourth Circuit and what was then the Fifth Circuit) that
consisted entirely of former slave states.310 Congress restored the Court to
nine Justices in 1869.311
Congress’ modification of the Court’s structure in light of its view that
the former slave states had too much influence on the Court is evidence of a
belief that geographic identity has, or is perceived to have, an influence on a

304. Id. at 800.
305. Epstein et al., supra note 42, at 613 (quoting WILLIAM J. DANIELS , THE

GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR IN APPOINTMENTS TO THE UNITED S TATES S UPREME COURT :
1789-1976, 31 W. POL. Q. 226, 227 (1978)).
306. Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and Justice: Parity and the United States Supreme Court, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 43, 48-49 (2007).
307. David M. O’Brien, Packing the Supreme Court, 1986 VA. Q. R EV. 189,
212 (1986).
308. Judicial Legislation, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/page/landmark_09.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
309. Reorganization of the Judicial Circuits: “An Act to Fix the Number of Judges
of the Supreme Court of the United States, and to Change Certain Judicial Circuits”,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_09.html
(last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
310. Id.
311. The Judiciary Act of 1869: “An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the
United States”, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_10.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
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judge’s decision making. If nothing else, it shows how important a state’s
identity can be with respect to the Supreme Court. From 1867 to 1877, the
“southern” seat on the Court vanished. 312 President Lincoln had five opportunities to appoint people to the Court.313 Not surprisingly, with the Civil
War influence he was especially sensitive to geography and the South’s identity as slave territory. And while he did not appoint anyone from the South,
he did use his five appointments to select men from four different states: Ohio
(two), Iowa, Illinois, and California.314
Shortly after Congress created the courts of appeals in 1891, presidents’
nominees to the Court started to come from judges who had already been on
the courts of appeals.315 Justice Howell Jackson, for example, was elevated
from the Sixth Circuit to the Supreme Court in 1893.316 President Eisenhower openly proclaimed that he would nominate candidates for the courts of
appeals with an eye to his nominees ultimately reaching the Supreme
Court.317 Today, Justice Kagan is the only Justice who does not have court of
appeals experience.318

2. The Waning Importance of Geographic Diversity
Since our early history, some aspects of the Article III judiciary have reflected the continuing sentiment that geographic diversity is important. For
example, although circuit riding stopped in 1891 with Congress’ establish-

312. See O’Brien, supra note 307. Justice Wayne from Georgia died in 1867 and
was replaced by Justice Bradley from New Jersey. JONATHAN D. VARAT, WILLIAM
COHEN & VIKRAM D. AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1732
(14th ed. 2013). In 1877, Justice Harlan of Kentucky was appointed to the Court by
President Hayes. Id. at 1733. Justice Powell of Virginia retired in 1987 and was
replaced by Justice Kennedy of California in 1988. Id. at 1737. Justice Thomas of
Georgia was appointed by President G.H.W. Bush in 1991 and is currently serving on
the Court. Id. at 1738. In 2005, he was joined by Chief Justice Roberts of Maryland,
who was appointed by President G.W. Bush. Id.
313. VARAT ET AL., supra note 312, at 1732.
314. Id. President Lincoln appointed Justices Chase and Swayne of Ohio, Justice
Miller of Iowa, Justices Davis of Illinois and Justice Field of California. Id.
315. SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER, RESEARCH SERV., R40802, SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE, AND LEGAL
EDUCATION, 1789-2010, at 17 (2010).
316. Joseph Jackson, 1898-1925, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.supreme
courthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/howell-jackson-1893-1895/
(last visited Apr. 19, 2014).
317. Epstein, Martin, Quinn & Segal, supra note 41, at 835.
318. Jonathan H. Adler, National Review: Watching an Inexperienced Justice,
NPR (Oct. 4, 2010, 7:38 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=130320426.
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ment of the circuit courts of appeals,319 Congress still requires that each circuit be represented by at least one Supreme Court Justice.320 In their capacities as circuit representatives, the Justices typically hear emergency appeals
and rarely sit as circuit judges.321 When a new Justice joins the Court, the
Chief Justice reviews the circuit assignments and makes adjustments.322 The
Chief Justice is assigned to the D.C., Fourth, and Federal Circuits.323 It appears that whenever possible, the Chief Justice assigns the Associate Justices
to their “home court” circuit when those become available.324 Currently,
Justices who are assigned to their “home” circuits include Justice Breyer
(First), Justice Ginsburg (Second), Justice Alito (Third), Justice Kennedy
(Ninth), and Justice Thomas (Eleventh).325 Justice Scalia is assigned to the
Fifth Circuit, an assignment originally made by Chief Justice Rehnquist in
1987.326 Justice Alito is also assigned to the Eighth Circuit.327 Justice Sotomayor is assigned to the Tenth Circuit (replacing Justice Breyer, who was
re-assigned to the First Circuit when Justice Souter retired), and Justice Kagan, the newest Justice, is assigned to the Sixth and Seventh Circuits (which
were represented by Justice Stevens before his retirement).328
Because the Justices rarely, if ever, sit as judges in their home circuits, their assignments are largely about representation. They represent
their “homes” and the people living there. Justice Thomas, for example,
is assigned to the Eleventh Circuit and when he visits the University of
Florida, he always makes a point of calling this circuit his circuit.329 In his
warm and gracious way, Justice Thomas connects with his “home” audience
and offers reassurances that he, as the circuit Justice, is constitutionally con319. Establishment of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_12.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2014). The legislation that abolished circuit riding is known as the Evarts Act. Id.
That Act did not eliminate the circuit courts, however. They were abolished in 1911.
The Judicial Code of 1911 and the Abolition of the U.S. Circuit Courts, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_13.html (last visited Mar.
21, 2014).
320. 28 U.S.C. § 42 (2012) (“A justice may be assigned to more than one circuit,
and two or more justices may be assigned to the same circuit.”).
321. Supreme Court of the United States, JUDGEPEDIA, http://judgepedia.org/
Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
322. See 28 U.S.C. § 42.
323. Circuit Allotment of Justices, U.S. SUPREME COURT (Sept. 28, 2010),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/ALLOTMENTORDER9-28-10.pdf.
324. See id.
325. Id.
326. Id.; 2d Justice for Fifth Circuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1987,
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/02/us/2d-justice-for-fifth-circuit.html.
327. Circuit Allotment of Justices, supra note 323.
328. Id.
329. Lindy McCollum-Brounley, Supreme Visit, UF LAW (Feb. 4, 2010),
https://www.law.ufl.edu/uflaw/feature/supreme-visit-2.
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nected to the circuit’s citizens. And his ideology has nothing to do with this
sentiment; it is simply a geographic bond that is deeply rooted in federalism
and shared identities.
Beginning with President Nixon’s term, however, geographic diversity
has played less and less of a role with respect to the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices. Some people suggest that it should be less important altogether in light of modern technology and the ability of people to connect with
each other around the world in a matter of seconds.330 But federalism will
always connect geographic diversity with the Article III judiciary, particularly
at the lower court level because of the way the judiciary is structured and the
involvement of the Senate in the confirmation process. Still, the connection
is weakening at the Supreme Court level. In the last twenty-seven years, a
little longer than the twenty-five year time period Justice O’Connor gave for
state colleges and universities to consider race in their admissions,331 there
have been thirteen Justices who self-identify as representing ten different
states: Arizona (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor), Illinois (Justices Stevens), California (Justice Kennedy), New Hampshire (Justice Souter), Massachusetts (Justices Breyer and Kagan), New Jersey (Justice Alito),
Georgia (Justice Thomas), Maryland (Chief Justice Roberts), Virginia (Justice Scalia), and New York (Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor).332 The last
“new” state to be represented on the Court is Arizona, with the appointment
of Justice Rehnquist in 1972 by President Nixon.333 Prior to that, the newest
state was Colorado in 1962 with the appointment of Justice White by President Kennedy.334 Nineteen states have never been represented on the Court:
Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.335
Another major concern that can be traced to the 1960s is the shrinking
pool from which potential nominees are selected. Specifically, since Justice
330. See, e.g., Seinfeld, supra note 107, at 113 n.54 (suggesting there is less concern about state courts being biased against federal claims because of “[c]enturies of
economic and . . . political and cultural interconnectedness . . . .”).
331. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
332. The Supreme Court website identifies the states with which the individual justices identify. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. SUPREME

COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Mar. 22,
2014). It is worth noting that when initially appointed to the Court, Justice Rehnquist
identified as an Arizonan, but when elevated to Chief Justice, he identified as a Virginian. Id.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice PreAppointment Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1163, 1163 n.82 (2012); Members of
the Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. SUPREME COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
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Thurgood Marshall was appointed to the Court from the Second Circuit
in 1967, only Justices Powell, O’Connor, and Kagan have not been court of
appeals judges.336 Since 1967, just over eighty-one percent of the Justices
had court of appeals experience.337 One positive observation from this trend
is that states’ voices are playing a greater role in the selection of Supreme
Court Justices. Their role in confirming lower court Article III judges,
particularly court of appeals judges, is much more critical now that most
Supreme Court nominees come from the courts of appeals. On the other
hand, of the thirteen Justices since 1967 with court of appeals experience,
Chief Justices Burger and Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg
all were elevated from the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit – a little over thirty-eight percent of the total number of
Justices selected over that period.338 This observation is not meant to diminish the qualifications of the Justices or any court of appeals judge. Rather,
it is merely to suggest that the pool of potential nominees could be much
larger and include nominees with different experiences. For example,
the pool could include state judges, practicing lawyers, law professors, and
even politicians.339
Should we, as a society, be concerned that virtually all Supreme Court
nominees come from the courts of appeals? Should we be concerned that
almost half of the current Justices were elevated from the same court of appeals? Does that give their home circuit too much representation at the expense of other circuits, diminishing the principle of federalism and its role in
the Article III judiciary?
Some empirical research shows that, just like the racial identity of a
judge is statistically significant in affecting the outcome in some types of
cases as discussed above,340 so too can the geographic identity of a judge be
statistically significant. Calling it the “circuit effects,” Professors Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn, and Jeffrey Segal’s empirical research
led them to be concerned about “the possibility that federal-appellate-judgesturned-Supreme-Court-Justices are predisposed to affirm decisions coming

336. See Associate Judges: Thurgood Marshall, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/histBio.html#Marshall (last visited Mar. 22,
2014); Associate Judges: Lewis F. Powell, Jr., LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.
law.cor-nell.edu/supct/justices/histBio.html#powell (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Associate Justices: Sandra Day O’Connor, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.
edu/supct/justices/histBio.html#oconnor (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Biographies of
Current Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 280.
337. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 332.
338. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 280;
Chief Justices: Warren E. Burger, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.
edu/supct/justices/histBio.html#burger (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
339. See Epstein, Martin, Quinn & Segal, supra note 41, at 834.
340. See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text.
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from the circuits they just left.”341 They caution that their research does not
find “circuit effects in the form of Justices consistently biased towards all the
U.S. courts of appeals.”342 However, their empirical studies show that “[f]or
some [Justices], the attachment [to their home circuit] is so strong that [the
Justice is] twice as likely to affirm decisions coming from [the Justice’s] former circuit as decisions coming from all others.”343 The authors are especially concerned that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and
Ginsburg all were elevated to the Court from the D.C. Circuit, giving cases on
appeal from that circuit a huge advantage.344 Admittedly, and presumably, a
justice who is inclined to be unfairly biased because of his or her geographic
identity probably does not even realize it. Because empirical studies show
that the Justices tend to favor their circuits in cases before the Court, the researchers conclude that the “norm has created a collective presumption in
favor of decisions handed down by the D.C. Circuit judges.”345
As the Court becomes less geographically diverse, we, as a society,
seem to become less aware of what the trend means. Here, a few lessons can
be learned from the Civil War era. Specifically, the reaction of Congress and
its efforts to reduce the influence of the former slave states by manipulating
the number of circuits and the number of justices gives pause for reflection
about what state identity means and how it relates to federalism, diversity,
equality, and Article III. A significant lesson can be learned from comparing
the opportunities President Lincoln had to appoint a Justice from the South
with the opportunities President Nixon had to do the same.
Clearly, Congress operated on the assumption that if President
Lincoln’s nominees came from southern states they would support slavery.
And, perhaps as a matter of politics and the need to be politically supported,
that was a realistic assumption. But to support slavery is to deny the humanity of blacks, as abolitionists and civil rights advocates acknowledged,
and would make someone clearly prejudiced. This helps explain, perhaps,
why President Lincoln did not nominate anyone from the South, although he
had five chances.
Now consider the situation with President Nixon. He had the opportunity in 1969 to replace Justice Fortas from Tennessee, and he selected his nominees on the conviction that people from the South “deserve representation on

341. Epstein, Martin, Quinn & Segal, supra note 41, at 837.
342. Id. at 837-38.
343. Id. at 834. In a footnote, the authors share that “in cases coming to the

Supreme Court from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the predicted probability of Justice Stephen Breyer – a former judge on that court – casting
a vote to affirm is 0.69; for cases coming from all other circuits, that figure is 0.29.”
Id. at 838 n.16.
344. Id. at 834, 838.
345. Id. at 838.
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the Court.”346 At the time, Justice Black of Alabama occupied the “southern”
seat;347 however, having another representative from the South would have
been consistent with geographic diversity.
In the 1960s, of course, the civil rights movement was in full swing.
The South openly resisted integration and insisted on keeping its historical
identity as a part of the country that did not support racial equality. Ignoring
that reality, President Nixon nominated two southerners: Clement
Haynsworth from South Carolina, and Harold Carswell from Florida.348 Both
men failed to get Senate confirmation and suffered this defeat at least partly
because of their records in support of segregation, which caused strong opposition from civil rights groups.349 Once again, the identity of southern states
as “racist” in violation of the Equality Principles figured prominently into the
politics associated with Article III.
One lesson learned was that the South’s identity as former “slave territory” and as “segregationists” played a role in President Lincoln’s decision
not to nominate someone from the South. By the time President Nixon
nominated Haynsworth and Carswell, it was very clear that the people did not
want racially-prejudiced Justices. To his credit, however, President Nixon
stood by his belief that the South deserved to be represented on the Court.
His misstep, then, was not nominating someone from the South; his misstep was nominating someone from the South with an identity that reflected a
South that did not believe in the Equality Principles. In other words,
President Nixon misjudged the senators who had to confirm his nominees.
Consistent with their oaths to uphold the Constitution, they were unwilling to
confirm nominees who supported segregation in violation of the Equality
Principles. The senators who voted “no” on Haynsworth and Carswell respected the delicate relationship among federalism, diversity, equality, and
the Article III judiciary.
Moreover, negative votes that respect that delicate balance are qualitatively different from negative votes that are based on ideology and are therefore purely political. This was the situation that caused the defeat of Judge
Robert Bork, who took an ideological stand about the “proper” way to interpret the Constitution that most senators disagreed with.350 Ultimately, President Nixon secured Senate confirmation of Justice Blackmun of Minnesota
even though Chief Justice Burger, also of Minnesota, was appointed to the
346. Richard Nixon, Statement About Nominations to the Supreme Court, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Apr. 9, 1970), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2456.
347. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 332.
348. Bruce H. Kalk, The Carswell Affair: The Politics of a Supreme Court Nomination in the Nixon Administration, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 261, 266, 268 (1998).
349. Supreme Court Nomination Battles: Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold
Carswell, TIME, http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1895
379_1895421_1895542,00.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
350. See, e.g., Stephan O. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirmations in the Era of Hatch and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REV. 247, 247, 328 (1999).
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Court in the previous year.351 In the history of the Court, the only other Justice from Minnesota was Justice Butler, who was appointed by President
Harding in 1923.352
But it is important to remember that just because a state has an identity
with respect to a particular issue, it does not mean that all of its citizens align
with that identity. It is just as misguided to essentialize state citizens in the
context of federalism as it is to essentialize individuals in the context of the
Group Equality Principle. Some citizens did not support segregation and may
have lived in states with Jim Crow laws. Today, someone can be a citizen of
a “medical marijuana” state and be opposed to this, yet still strongly identify
with his or her state. In fact, to ignore the experiential diversity among citizens within a state is inconsistent with the Equality Principles.
The empirical research that supports the “circuit effects” also gives
pause for reflection. Certainly, one way to avoid that bias is for presidents to
select nominees who are not already federal judges.353 But to disregard a
state’s right to be represented on the Court is inconsistent with federalism.
Except for the years 1867 to 1877, and again from 1987 to 1991, there has
always been a Justice from the South354 on the Court. Currently, Chief Justice Roberts of Maryland and Justice Thomas of Georgia are from the
South.355 As noted earlier, the greatest percentage of African Americans in
the United States live in the South.356 The experiences of an African American from the South undoubtedly brings legitimacy to the Court – both as a
matter of federalism and consistent with the Equality Principles. Justice
Thomas exemplifies this. Moreover, having an African American from the
South, regardless of his or her judicial ideology, is one way to begin to
change the historical identity that many in the South want to leave behind.
Significantly, no other issue since slavery has so sharply shaped a state’s
identity and, in the larger picture, whole geographic regions. The slavery
issue was unique in dividing the country into two geographic regions:
south/slave and north/free. And many issues currently in the political spot351. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 332;
Chief Justices: Warren E. Burger, supra note 338.
352. See Members of the Supreme Court of the Unites States, supra note 332.
353. See supra note 350.
354. See Members of the Supreme Court of the Unites States, supra note 332. The
“South” generally is defined as those states below the Mason Dixon Line, the Ohio
River and the 36th parallel, and includes Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, D.C., Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The South,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/555542/
the-South (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
355. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 280.
356. SONYA RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, The Black Population: 2010,
2010 U.S. CENSUS (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/
briefs/c2010br-06.pdf.
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light remind us of how intense the debate between states’ rights and individual rights can be; abortion and gun control are two poignant examples. But as
intense as the political fight is in those debates, they are not tied to geographic regions in the same way slavery was.
Moreover, the empirical evidence suggesting that a Justice is more likely to vote in favor of his home circuit brings us full circle. Everyone is aware
that there are ideological differences among Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas. Everyone is aware that they also hold different views about how best to uphold the Equality Principles. What the empirical evidence suggests, however, is that perhaps judges – at all levels and
regardless of ideology – have an unconscious bias that causes them to vote
for the “home team.” This is the very fear behind the creation of diversity
jurisdiction, which, ironically, is not supported by empirical evidence.

B. Suggestions for Increasing Geographic Diversity
Some scholars are exploring different ways to address problems they see
with the way the current Court functions. For example, Professors Adam
Morse and Julian Yap propose increasing the number of Justices to fifteen
and dividing cases among panels of nine Justices.357 They estimate that this
model would enable the Court to increase the number of cases it hears from
roughly seventy-four to 135.358 Professors Michael Dorf and Lisa McElory
propose that retired Justices be allowed to hear cases when a sitting Justice
has to recuse himself or herself.359 Professors Paul Carrington and Roger
Cramton propose the creation of a specialized court to decide which cases
should be granted certiorari for review by the Supreme Court.360 Their basic
premise is that the Court should be deciding more cases and relying less on
their clerks to decide which cases the Court should hear. Their proposal is to
create the “Certiorari Division of the Supreme Court.”361
These examples highlight that some scholars think the Court’s method
of operation could be improved. This Article agrees and suggests that greater
geographic diversity on the Court would be consistent with federalism and
equality. One way to achieve this goal would be to increase the number of
Justices on the Court. Obviously, the Court cannot have fifty Justices; however, a viable option is to have at least one Justice from each of the geograph357. Adam H. Morse & Julian E. Yap, A Panel-Based Supreme Court, 37 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 23, 25 (2011).
358. Id. at 32, 42.
359. Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming off the Bench: Legal and Policy Implications of Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the
Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 83-84 (2011).
360. Paul. D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in
Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587,
591 (2009).
361. Id. at 632.

File: Rush – Final Edits

2014]

Created on: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM

Last Printed: 6/12/2014 2:55:00 PM

FEDERALISM, DIVERSITY, EQUALITY, AND JUDGES

183

ic areas – circuits – on the bench. Recall that this was the situation until concerns about the southern slave states having too much influence on the Court
caused Congress to reduce the number of circuits and Justices.362
Interestingly, Professors Carrington and Cramton’s proposal to create a
“Certiorari Division of the Supreme Court” is consistent with this idea. They
suggest staffing the Division with thirteen experienced federal judges.363
Significantly, their recommendation to appoint thirteen judges to the Division
is not arbitrary. Rather, they are concerned with ensuring geographic representation and treating the states, as regional circuits, equally: “One member
of the group might be drawn from each of the regional circuits to preclude
suspicion of geographic bias.”364 Similarly, thirteen Justices on the Court
maximizes federalism; the Federal Circuit representative creates an odd number of Justices, minimizing the chances of tie votes. Over time, the chances
of any particular state having a Justice on the Court would be immeasurably
increased. But there is federalism value in having each geographic circuit
represented on the Court.
Probably the most realistic way to increase geographic diversity on the
Court is suggested by Professors Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal, who call
for presidents to be more sensitive to the possibility of putting forward nominees from underrepresented circuits.365 Because there is now a “norm” of
selecting nominees from the circuit courts, it is important for the President
and senators to be aware of the “circuit effects” and its implications for protecting federalism and equality principles. This knowledge, naturally, can
become part of the political fodder. On the other hand, the President and
senators take oaths to uphold the Constitution. Equal representation is a core
democratic value and one that applies to both states and individuals.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The relationship among federalism, diversity, equality, and Article
III judges is complex and many recent cases highlight how federalism and
equality often are pitted against each other, as if one value must be more
important than the other. This Article illustrates how similar these values are
in the context of understanding identity and bias. The age-old reason behind
diversity jurisdiction – to escape the perceived unfair bias of local state judges who share a geographic identity with the hometown litigant – provides a
solid foundation for exploring how accusations of that bias are similar to
See supra Part VII.A.
Carrington & Cramton, supra note 360, at 632.
Id.
Epstein, Martin, Quinn & Segal, supra note 41, at 877. The authors’ first
choice for improving the way the Court is structured is for the President to move
away from the “norm” of nominating sitting court of appeals judges and looking to a
larger pool of potential candidates, including law professors, legislators, executives,
and state judges. Id. at 834.
362.
363.
364.
365.
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more recent accusations of unfair bias often targeted at historically underrepresented judges when their identities are the same as the litigants who
appear before them.
This Article focuses on the idea of “experiential bias” to distinguish it
from the unfair bias associated with diversity jurisdiction and judges of underrepresented groups. Experiential bias shapes the identity of every human
being, including Article III judges. Moreover, an individual’s experiences are
shaped by all of their identity traits, including their geographic identity. Article III judges, because they are responsible for protecting all constitutional
values, must draw on their experiences to determine how to balance competing values in different situations. Experiential bias is inevitable and cannot
automatically disqualify anyone from being a judge; if it did, no one could be
a judge. Significantly, being experientially biased does not mean one is
above the rule of law – quite the opposite, it means one understands how to
apply the rule of law in ways that respect core constitutional values like federalism and equality. It means one has a deep respect for how core constitutional values work together to promote fairness and justice. Justice Holmes’
words of wisdom at the beginning of this Article ring true: “The life of the
law has not been logic; it has been experience.”

